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Whenever there is in any country, uncultivated lands
and unemployed poor, it is clear that the laws of property
have been so far extended as to violate a natural right.
The earth is given as commonstock for man to labor and
live on. If for the encouragement of industry we allow it to
be appropriated, we must take care that other employ-
ment be provided to those excluded from the appropria-
tion. If we do not, the fundamental right to labor the earth
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T HIS thesis consists of three essays which measure land security, es-timate agricultural efficiency and farm productivity, and analyze
their impacts on farm income in rural China. The rural reform starting
in the late 1970s improved farmers’ incentives and has had great impacts
on China’s agricultural production and farm income growth. Since the
onset of the reform with the implementation of the household responsi-
bility system (HRS), the former communal production system was decen-
tralized, the state-monopolized procurement and marketing system for
agricultural products was gradually reformed, the rural labor forces and
other relevant production endowments of farm households were largely
liberalized and were given control of their own matters. As a result,
agricultural output has increased enormously from 139.7 billion Chinese
Yuan in 1978 to 6036.1 billion Chinese Yuan in 2009, and the per capita
net income of a farm household has grown dramatically from 133.57 Chi-
1
nese Yuan in 1978 to 5153.17 Chinese Yuan in 2009.1
1.1 Motivations behind the research
Numerous authors interested in China’s dramatic agricultural develop-
ment since the reform have made efforts to explain changes in produc-
tivity and explore the growth sources behind it, including Lin (1992); Wu
(1995); Kalirajan et al. (1996); Fan (1997); Mao and Koo (1997); Lambert
and Parker (1998); Fan (1999); Wu et al. (2001); Brümmer et al. (2006);
Chen et al. (2008) and so on. These studies convey some core messages:
Over the past three decades, the improvement of productivity has been
spectacular and has resulted mainly from technical progress, whereas
the efficiency change is not so inspiring after the completion of HRS re-
form in 1984. In transition countries, there is evidence of institutional
incompleteness or failure and even the lack of complementary institu-
tions accompanying the reform course. For instance, market uncertain-
ties and incompleteness, poorly developed credit markets, an incomplete
legal system, information asymmetries and path-dependencies influenc-
ing the efficiency of the privatization process have all been found to have
significant implications for efficiency and growth (see Brandt et al., 2002;
Curtiss, 2002).
Considering the various land related issues that are currently being hotly
disputed in China, the remaining ambiguity over land tenure rights seems
1These data are taken from the 1985 China Rural Statistical Yearbook and the
2010 China Statistical Yearbook provided by the National Bureau of Statistics of China
(NBSC).
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to be closely connected to the deterioration of technical efficiency after
1990. One event highlights the necessity of further study regarding land
tenure security and its relationships with efficiency and productivity and
hence rural income. After eight years of controversy and discussion, the
Property Law of the People’s Republic of China was approved on March
16, 2007 and went into effect on October 1, 2007. The law stipulates
equal protection of state, collective and private property rights. As for ru-
ral land issues, it says: In order to give farmers a long-term, guaranteed
land-use rights, after expiry of the contract of arable land, grassland and
woodland, those who own the contracted land use rights have the rights
to continue to contract in accordance with the relevant state regulations.
Taking into account the former codified laws of the Land Management
Law (1998) and the Land Contracting Law (2003), the government has
consistently been concerned about strengthening individual farm house-
hold rights to land.
In spite of all of these efforts, the new land tenure system under HRS
is inadequate, and individual farm household rights are incomplete. As
Dong (1996) and Yao (2010) point out, this land tenure system is actu-
ally a two-tier land tenure system in which the village collective and
the individual household share the land rights, and the balance point
can be anywhere from complete collective ownership to complete indi-
vidual ownership. This also explains the considerable variations in land
rights or land tenure security across regions in rural China.2 Conceptu-
2See Liu et al. (1998); Yao (2000a); Brandt et al. (2002) for more comprehensive dis-
cussions of a wide variety of land tenure arrangements in Chinese villages regarding
the delineation of rights, the security of rights, and the procedure to make changes.
3
ally, Deininger and Feder (2001) associates land tenure insecurity with
the lack of well-defined property rights. They argue that the improved
institutional environment, no matter whether it is made up of formal in-
stitutions (land titles) or informal institutions (customary tenure) that
help mitigate or even eliminate the threat of insecurity, will clearly in-
crease the benefit to farm households through productivity-enhancing,
long-term investments, and, in turn, the farmers will be more willing to
invest in the land. In rural China, individual farm households do not
have the legal titles to the land they farm, and as a result, they usually
face the risk of administrative land reallocation and adjustment. The pos-
sibility of land reallocation gives rise to the problem of tenure insecurity,
which is similar to a random tax levied on a farmer’s land investment be-
cause there is a risk that the farmer will lose his or her land in the future.
This induced land tenure insecurity reduces farm households’ incentives
to invest in the land and to use the labor forces efficiently, and it may
decrease agricultural productivity and hence negatively affect farmers’
income.3
1.2 Objectives and research topics of the study
The objectives of this study are to contribute to the ongoing estimation
and explanation of China’s agricultural productivity growth since the
rural reform and to explore the impact of land tenure security on farm
households’ productive efficiency and income in China’s unique land tenure
3See Kung (2000); Deininger and Feder (2001); Brandt et al. (2002) for more detailed
discussions of land tenure security and land reallocation issues.
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system. Starting from the research motivations, the following three top-
ics are proposed to study land security, efficiency and productivity, and
farm income in rural China:
1. Productivity and efficiency change since the reform in the past three
decades.
2. Administrative land reallocation, which induces land tenure inse-
curity, and its impact on technical efficiency (TE).
3. Land tenure security, input allocative efficiency, and their impact on
farm household income.
These three research topics are implicitly connected, and the logic be-
hind them is the following. First, interested in China’s great achievement
in rural reform and impressive improvement in agricultural production,
this study follows the previous empirical research done by Lin (1992); Fan
(1997); Lambert and Parker (1998); Fan (1999); Brümmer et al. (2006);
Chen et al. (2008), and extends their work by covering a longer research
period of China’s rural reform, from 1979 to 2008. On the macro level, we
use aggregate provincial level data, which are provided by the Interna-
tional Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the National Bureau of
Statistics of China (NBSC) to calculate indices of total factor productivity
(TFP) change and its three components: technical change (TC), techni-
cal efficiency (TE) change, and a scale effect. Consistent with the previ-
ous empirical results, we find that the impressive improvement of TFP
change (222%) over the past three decades is dominated by the outstand-
ing performance of technical change (360.5%). At the same time, both
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technical efficiency change (-18.5%) and the scale effects (-3.6%) however
have negative impact on the improvement in TFP. What impresses us
is that the best performance in terms of technical efficiency is exhibited
in the first reform phase (1979-1984) and that technical efficiency dete-
riorated substantially after that period. At the same time, the trend of
divergence across provinces in terms of technical efficiency is obvious in
the whole sample period.
From an institutional environment perspective, we continue our work on
the causes or sources of bad performance in terms of efficiency with a spe-
cial focus on the inadequate land tenure system accompanying HRS. This
leads to our second research topic. The dataset used for the study is pro-
vided by the Research Center for Rural Economy (RCRE) of China, and
includes individual farm household data and the associated village data
of the three representative provinces (Zhejiang, Hubei and Yunnan) cov-
ering the period from 1995 to 2002. This rich dataset provides us with an
opportunity to simultaneously study land reallocation at the farm house-
hold level, as well as the potentially important affecting factors at the
village level, which has not yet been conducted by other researchers. The
fact that each province has a specific economic environment and distinct
land tenure arrangement allows us to compare the impact of land reallo-
cation on technical efficiency among the three provinces.
As is already discussed in Section 1.1, Deininger and Feder (2001) as-
serts that the improved institutional environment, which helps mitigate
or even eliminate the threat of insecurity, will clearly increase the ben-
efit to farm households through productivity-enhancing, long-term in-
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vestments, and, in turn, farmers will be more willing to invest in the
land. Considering that the number of rural enterprises has grown rapidly
and that off-farm income has accounted for a large proportion of the to-
tal income for farm households since the reform, we extend the analy-
sis beyond agricultural production to incorporate both agricultural and
non-agricultural activities. For the third research topic, individual farm
household data of the Zhejiang and Hubei provinces covering the period
from 1995 to 2002 provided by RCRE are used to study land tenure se-
curity and input allocative efficiency in the two sectors, and to examine
their impact on farm household income.
1.3 Outline of the chapters
An outline of the contents of the subsequent chapters is provided in this
section. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 form the main body of this thesis, dealing
with the three topics discussed in the above section, respectively. Chap-
ter 5 summarizes the results from the studies and presents the policy
implications.
Chapter 2: In this chapter, a stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) approach
is applied to estimate the production function of China’s agricultural ac-
tivity and to explain variation in technical efficiency. After that, cumu-
lative (chained) indices are calculated for TFP change and its three com-
ponents: technical change, a scale component, and technical efficiency
change. For the explanation of variation in technical efficiency, besides
the conventional control variables, we additionally introduce a series of
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variables in the model to capture the effects of rural policy reforms in
the past three decades and the impact of different regional development
levels. Then the effects of the government’s rural policies in different
reform phases and the regional variations in TFP change and its three
components are discussed comprehensively in the rest of the chapter.
Chapter 3: In this chapter, we first check our sample for the incidence
of administrative land reallocation, which is proven to be common, and
the results are consistent with that of other empirical studies. Benefiting
from the data structure of including both individual farm household data
and the associated village data, we then investigate whether and how the
relevant factors affect administrative land reallocation (stage 1 model).
The presumed influencing factors consist of variables representing farm
and household characteristics (household level data), social and economic
development conditions of the village (village level data), and relevant
government policies (yearly dummy variables). Lastly, we estimate the
impact of administrative land reallocation on technical effciency using a
stochastic production frontier model (stage 2 model). Some interesting
empirical results from the stage 1 and stage 2 models are presented in
this part, and they are explained and discussed in detail.
Chapter 4: In this chapter, we assume that land tenure insecurity neg-
atively affects input allocative efficiency (within agricultural production,
and between agricultural and non-agricultural activities) and, in turn,
the income of the farm household. Theoretically, the farm household
profit maximization problem in the neoclassical production theory set-
ting is modified by adding a series of institutional environment and mar-
8
ket constraints. In the econometric estimation, the normalized quadratic
profit function with the addition of a vector of control variables represent-
ing the effects of land tenure insecurity, input less-than-optimum alloca-
tion, and their interactions are applied to study the profit maximization
problem of farm household in our sample. The empirical results show
that land tenure insecurity has no direct effect on farm household in-
come in both provinces, but its indirect effects through the interactions
with other input allocations are observed in the Hubei province.
Chapter 5: In this chapter, we summarize the empirical results from
Chapters 2, 3, and 4. After that, we present the policy implications.
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Chapter 2
Productivity change and the
effects of policy reform in
China’s agriculture in the past
three decades
The main contents of this chapter are based on the article “Productivity
change and the effects of policy reform in China’s agriculture since 1979”,
and this article is a cooperation with Bernhard Brümmer. It has been
accepted for publication in the journal Asian-Pacific Economic Literature.
It will appear in print for issue 25(2), November 2011.
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2.1 Introduction
THE rural reform that started in the late 1970s improved farmers’incentives and has had great impacts on China’s agricultural pro-
duction and productivity growth. Agricultural output has increased enor-
mously from 139.7 billion China Yuan in 1978 to 6036.1 billion China
Yuan in 2009, and per capita net income of the farm household has dra-
matically grown from 133.57 China Yuan in 1978 to 5153.17 China Yuan
in 2009.1
Whether or not agriculture features slow productivity growth relative to
other sectors has been an important and long-disputed topic. Martin and
Mitra (2001) show that agriculture generally had faster TFP growth than
manufacturing. They also find evidence of a tendency towards relatively
rapid convergence in agricultural productivity across countries. Similar
results are also obtained in other international studies, such as Moutinho
and Machado (e.g. 2003). This information about agricultural productiv-
ity is useful for the design of the economic growth strategy of developing
countries like China. Moreover, considering agricultural productivity by
looking at China as a small world consisting of regions (or provinces) with
different development levels and unique resources is also instructive for
policymakers who are seeking ways of closing the ever-growing income
gaps among regions. A recent research by Chen et al. (2008) indicates
that provinces with high income usually had better agricultural produc-
tivity performance than those with low income. Their empirical results
1These data are taken from the 1985 China Rural Statistical Yearbook and the 2010
China Statistical Yearbook provided by National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC).
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further find that regional disparities in terms of cumulative TFP growth
have increased over time, and that eastern and coastal provinces consis-
tently outperformed the other regions in China.
China’s agricultural production and rural development have experienced
comprehensive changes in the past three decades. Tracing the course
of the rural reform, we could see clear phases with different policy fo-
cuses in each of the stages. There are varying classifications of rural
reform phases in the literature. In general, the rural reform started with
a focus primarily on decentralizing the system of agricultural produc-
tion and reforming the agricultural procurement system. Then policies
were designed aiming at liberalizing both the factor and the product mar-
kets, reforming the united procurement and marketing system. During
this period, policies were frequently adjusted in response to market price
changes and food security concerns, especially those policies connected to
grain market. With the final elimination of the grain quota procurement
system in 2001 and an accomplishment of the marketization reform of
grain in 2004, the government major policy directives has concentrated
on addressing questions of rural social welfare and income distribution.
Hence, it is useful to examine how the agricultural productivity of dif-
ferent regions developed, and in which way rural reform affected China’s
agricultural production in the past. Of great interest will be whether pre-
vious or current policies have contributed to or worked against improve-
ment in productivity and efficiency. Identifying the sources of China’s
agricultural productivity change in different reform phases is also impor-
tant for the future course of rural reform in China. This chapter is or-
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ganized as follows. The next section will review the major policy reforms
in China over the past three decades and then give an overview of the
previous empirical results regarding China’s TFP change and the impact
of policy reform. The third section will be devoted to measuring produc-
tivity change and its decomposition. Data description and the specified
translog production frontier model will be presented in section 2.4. We
will present and discuss the empirical results in the subsequent section,
and the last section will conclude with the main findings and implications
of the study.
2.2 Policy reform and agricultural TFP growth
in China
2.2.1 Rural reform in China since 1979
Rural reform in China since the initiation of reform in 1979 can be roughly
divided into six phases (1979-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1993, 1994-1997,
1998-2003, and post-2003). The first period (1979-1984) focused on the
decentralization of the production system and reforming the agricultural
procurement system (Fan et al., 2002). The commune system was dis-
mantled, and land use rights were granted to individual farm households.
At the end of this phase, the newly introduced household responsibility
system (HRS) was adopted by most of the rural communities as a repace-
ment. This family based production system endows farmers with the
freedom to control their production with the exception of the obligation
13
to first fulfill government procurement quotas. In addition to reductions
of quota quantities and increases in procurement prices over this period,
more and more commodities were phased out of the government procure-
ment programs,2 and were allowed to be traded in rural markets. As a
result, both agricultural output and factor productivity grew significantly.
Meanwhile, a series of problems emerged which centered on the exist-
ing procurement system. Since above-quota or market prices were much
higher than the quota prices, farmers usually preferred to find ways
of evading quota fulfillment. A second problem was that the procure-
ment system was designed to operate in a shortage economy and was
ill-suited to handle emerging agricultural surpluses, which burdened the
state with having to buy ever-increasing quantities of products at high
above-quota prices. Other problems of the procurement system are re-
lated to the differences in demand and the inequalities among regions
(see Sicular, 1988, for more details).
These problems led to the second stage of reforms. The second phase
(1985-1989) was designed to further liberalize the country’s agricultural
pricing and marketing systems (Fan et al., 2002). Attempting to reform
the united procurement and marketing system for the first time, the gov-
ernment cut the above-quota prices for grain and other main products
and established a new pricing system based on a weighted average of the
quota and above-quota prices (a thirty-seventy ratio for grain and a forty-
sixty ratio for oilseeds). Correspondingly, a system of negotiated pur-
chase contracts was implemented, where farmers negotiated and signed
2The number of commodities under the government procurement system was re-
duced from 113 to 38 by 1984 (Fan et al., 2002).
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purchase contracts with the government before planting, but were free
to trade the above-contract production in rural markets. Meanwhile, the
amount of production under the contract system was further reduced and
more products were liberalized. However, the government still main-
tained control over strategic products (grain, cotton, etc.). Thus a two-
tiered system consisting of both market and central planning elements
existed during this period (Wu, 1997; Gabre-Madhin et al., 2003).
In regard to the effects of the reform in the second phase, Sicular (1988)
points out that in practice the grain contracts were not always voluntary,
but often similar to the old procurement quotas, only with a limitation of
state procurement to the contract amount, which helped ease public stor-
age and budgetary problems. Meanwhile, input prices increased much
faster than the government’s output procurement prices, raising produc-
tion costs (Fan et al., 2002). The resulting lower output growth compared
with the former phase raised questions about the new procurement and
pricing system.
From the beginning of 1990s, China’s agriculture entered a new develop-
ment stage. Accompanied by an acceleration of economic reform in urban
areas, the state further reformed the united procurement and market-
ing system. The number of commodities subject to state procurement
programs declined from 38 in 1985 to only 9 in 1991 (Fan et al., 2002).
The grain market system, which already had low procurement prices and
even lower subsidized prices for urban consumers, was changed as ration
prices were raised by 68% in 1991 and by another 45% in 1992, almost
eliminating the gap between procurement prices and retail prices (Wu,
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1997). In 1993, the grain market was further liberalized as the grain
rationing system was abolished, which had existed for 40 years. Mean-
while, more than 90% of all agricultural production was sold at market-
determined prices, indicating China’s agriculture had been transformed
from a command-and-control system to a largely free-market one (Fan
et al., 2002).
However, even with these attempts at comprehensive liberalization, var-
ious price and quantity controls (for grain, cotton, and oil crops vs. live-
stock and vegetables) remained in operation for certain commodities do-
mestically, between regional markets, and towards world markets, thereby
effectively keeping regional markets segmented and decoupled from in-
ternational markets (Brümmer et al., 2006).
Most reforms in the fourth period (1994-1997) were focused on the rebirth
of the self-sufficiency objective. In 1992, some local governments liberal-
ized both procurement and retail prices in local grain markets, which
finally ended the unified procurement and marketing system for grain
across the country. However, food prices increased excessively in some
regions at the end of 1993. As a result, the provincial governor’s respon-
sibility system was introduced to balance local grain supply and demand.
Under this system, the governor of a province is required to take full
responsibility for the province’s grain economy, which intensified the lo-
cal governments’ intervention in the grain market. This policy measure
meant, to some extent, a return to the objective of regional grain self-
sufficiency, which caused severe misallocations of resources within and
among provinces. However, it eventually also put an end to the central-
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ized control of grain production, which could facilitate grain production
suited to local conditions (Wu, 1997; Lin and Zhang, 1999).
To increase farmers’ incomes and to meet food security goals, the gov-
ernment raised procurement prices for grain by 40% in 1994 and by an-
other 42% in 1996. As a result, agricultural production expanded rapidly,
and the gap between procurement and market prices narrowed. In 1997,
market prices fell below procurement prices following two consecutive
bumper crops, and in response the government launched a price support
policy to protect the interest of grain producers (Fan et al., 2002; Brüm-
mer et al., 2006).
The fifth period (1998-2003) can be summarized as a transition period in-
tegrating rural development with overall economic reforms. Facing a se-
ries of problems in the grain procurement and marketing system, includ-
ing a heavy financial burden because of excessively increased grain stocks
and the huge debt of state-owned grain enterprises, the government im-
plemented a new round of grain procurement and marketing reform, the
so-called ’three policies and one reform’ in 1998 (Li, 2005). The three
policies procured farmers’ surpluses to the largest extent at subsidized
prices, correlated market prices and procurement prices of state-owned
grain enterprises (SGEs), and centralized the state grain purchase fund
for grain procurement. The one reform consisted of an acceleration in the
reform of the state-owned grain enterprises. However, problems arose
from the contemporaneous official announcement that only state-owned
grain enterprises were allowed to procure grain from farmers, prohibit-
ing private dealers from entering the market. This was to some extent
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a reverse to the government’s monopolistic control of the grain market.
There were also some problems related to the implementation of subsi-
dized prices for grain. The SGEs were expected to undertake state pro-
curement at subsidized prices and to operate as a commercial enterprise
marketing grains at a profit. This double role of the SGEs led to inconsis-
tency in the goals of state procurement in that it sought to both increase
profit and to support income . Another problem was the lack of funds for
implementing these policies because of budgetary constraints in many
major grain-producing regions (OECD, 2005). During this period, the
government continued to adjust the previous grain reform policies, and
in 2001 the quota procurement system was finally eliminated and a free
grain market was introduced in major consuming regions. In 2004, the
free grain market spread to most of the regions in China, indicating an
accomplishment of the marketization reform of grains (see Li, 2005).
Faced with a growing income gap between urban and rural areas, the gov-
ernment began to adopt policies to raise farmers’ income nationwide with
a fundamental shift from taxing agriculture to supporting it. A series of
policy measures have been implemented to support agricultural produc-
ers, including: input subsidies for farmers to purchase improved seed
for wheat, corn, rice and soybeans starting in 2002; direct payments to
farmers engaged in grain production as a trial in 2002, and later nation-
wide in 2004; and an agricultural tax reform as a trial in 2000, and later
phased in across rural China starting in 2004. At the end of 2005, the
government formally announced that it would fully abolish agricultural
tax starting at the beginning of 2006, a tax that had been implemented
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for 2600 years (see OECD, 2005, for more details).
Between 2004 and 2008, with five consecutive No. 1 Documents 3 focusing
on rural areas and particularly on issues related to agriculture, farmers,
and the countryside (the so-called three nongs), China’s approach to ru-
ral policy has evolved towards a comprehensive framework which aims
at addressing questions of rural social welfare and income distribution.
The major policy directives concentrate on increasing farmers’ income,
reducing the rural-urban gap, raising agricultural production capacities,
maintaining food security, improving environmental sustainability, and
integrating the economic and social development of urban and rural ar-
eas (see OECD, 2009b, for more details). In line with these documents,
the government set up a series of price and income support policies. From
2004 on, a liberalized pricing system has been applied to all agricultural
commodities except tobacco; since then, eligible firms have been allowed
to buy and sell grains on the open market where grain prices were largely
liberalised. Minimum prices for grains, which are set every year by the
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in consultation
with other governmental institutions, were first announced in 2004 for
early indica rice and japonica rice, and then extended to include wheat in
2006. With regard to the aim of supporting grain production and increas-
ing the income of grain producers , direct payments were implemented
at the national level in 2004, which are based on current area sown for
rice, wheat, or corn, and are financed from the National Grain Risk Fund.
3No. 1 Documents are the top priority documents issued jointly at the beginning of
each year by the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the State Council.
They are the first major policy directives of the year and give policy suggestions for the
National People’s Congress (NPC) (OECD, 2009b, p. 127).
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In addition, the government introduced a subsidy for reproductive sows
which started in 2007 to encourage pig production. At the same time,
the government has continued and expanded its policies on input subsi-
dies. Comprehensive subsidy on agricultural inputs was introduced in
2006 to compensate farmers in response to an increase of agricultural
inputs prices such as fertilizers, pesticides, plastic films and diesel. The
amount of subsidies for improved quality seeds continued to increase,
with subsidies for rapeseeds and cotton added in 2007. Since 2004, the
government has provided a subsidy for the purchase of agricultural ma-
chinery, which is available to individual farmers as well as to so-called
specialised households and agricultural machine service delivery organi-
sations. The subsidy has been used primarily to target the mechanization
of wheat harvesting and rice planting, but was extended in 2007 by way
of trials to support the mechanization of corn harvesting. Since food secu-
rity is still one of the major concerns for the government, the conversion
of farmland for non-agricultural use is strictly controlled. The Property
Law of the People’s Republic of China, which went into effect on Octo-
ber 1, 2007, stipulates equal protection of state, collective, and private
property rights, and further formalizes farmers’ land use rights .
2.2.2 Empirical results on TFP change and policy re-
form impacts
Numerous authors interested in China’s dramatic agricultural develop-
ment since the reform have made efforts to explain changes in productiv-
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ity and to explore the growth sources behind it. Lin (1992) applies the
production function approach proposed by Griliches (1963) to evaluate
the effects of the various components of reforms on agricultural growth.
He reports that the productivity change resulting from various reforms
made up 48.64 percent of the output growth, and the dominant source
of output growth in the 1978-1984 period was the change from the pro-
duction team system to HRS. Although the changes in market prices and
state procurement prices in the 1978-1984 period did not affect the total
factor productivity, his results indicate that the substantial increase in
the state procurement price had a significant impact on output growth,
contributing 15.98 percent of the growth. He explains the slowdown in
output growth in the second phase as the result of the completion of HRS
reform between 1983 and 1984 and the sharp drop in the state procure-
ment prices relative to input prices.
Using the Törnqvist-Theil index approach, Fan (1997) estimates that
agricultural production increased by more than 6.6 percent per annum
and productivity by 5.1 percent per annum during the first stage of the
reforms. From 1985 to 1995, agricultural production and productivity
continued to rise rapidly with growth rates of 5.6 percent and 3.9 per-
cent per annum respectively, although at a lower pace than during the
first phase of the reforms. Fan (1999) applies a frontier shadow cost func-
tion approach to the case of rice production in the Jiangsu province using
aggregated cell means of the prefectural household data. He presents
measures of technical and allocative efficiency as well as the rate of tech-
nical change from 1980 to 1993. The results show that technical efficiency
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improved substantially in the first stage of the reforms (with an annual
growth rate of 8.5%), while improvement of both technical and allocative
efficiency stagnated after that. The rate of technical change continued to
increase over the whole study period, which the author explains as a re-
sult of long-term government investment in technology and rural infras-
tructure. One particularly interesting finding is that technical efficiency
has relatively small regional variations in contrast to allocative efficiency.
Lambert and Parker (1998) use a distance function measure of productiv-
ity change and obtain a sequence of technical change, technical efficiency,
and multifactor productivity (MFP) indices on the provincial level for the
period from 1979 to 1995. The results show outward shifts in the produc-
tion possibilities set over this period. They furthermore demonstrate that
most of the recorded changes in MFP for the most progressive provinces
are attributable to shifts in the production possibilities frontier, while the
effect of technical efficiency change is limited. Longitudinally, the highest
rates of improvement in MFP are found in the period from 1979 to 1984,
as the process of decollectivization picked up speed, as well as in the three
years after reform accelerated in 1992 as part of the goal of creating the
Socialist Market Economy. However, these results are not unambiguous,
as MFP indices of all provinces do not all move in the same direction.
Brümmer et al. (2006) also apply a distance function approach using in-
dividual farm household data in the Zhejiang province from 1986 to 2000.
Based on estimates in a stochastic frontier framework, they find the high-
est rate of TFP growth in the period from 1985 to 1989 (i.e., the second
policy reform phase). Main factors are large improvements in technical
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efficieny and a moderate rate of technical progress. When entering the
1990s, the increase in factor productivity slows down and technical effi-
ciency decreases. The authors argue that the market-oriented reforms of
the mid-80s continued to exert a positive influence on technical efficiency
but that the incompleteness of the reforms led to allocative distortions
between the agricultural subsectors, which hampered improvements in
terms of allocative efficiency. The authors suggest that input quality
problems might be partially responsible for the slowdown of TFP growth
and technical efficiency in the 1990s. For example, provision of extension
services and land quality might have deteriorated. Another factor might
be related to institutional inefficiencies, in that land property rights were
extensively redistributed in the 1990s. Besides this, the uncertainty in
land tenure weakens farmers’ investment incentives in land. Further-
more, the outflow of educated and younger farmers from agriculture could
also have a negative impact on the development in technical efficiency.
Using a sequential data envelopment analysis (DEA) approach, Chen
et al. (2008) calculate the output-oriented Malmquist productivity in-
dexes and their decomposition based on a panel dataset of 29 provinces in
China over the period 1990-2003. Their results indicate that the national
average TFP grew at an annual rate of 1.5% during the sample period
and that the major source of productivity growth was technical progress,
while the performance in terms of the efficiency has deteriorated over
the entire period. And the comparisons across the provinces show that
the regional disparities in productivity growth have worsened over time.
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2.3 Analytical framework
The productivity of a production unit is defined as ’the ratio of the out-
put(s) that it produces to the input(s) that it uses’ (Coelli et al., 1998, p.2).
’Productivity change occurs when an index of outputs changes at a dif-
ferent rate than an index of inputs does’ (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003,
p.279). Initially, the shifts in production technology (neutral technical
change) were regarded as the only source of productivity change; later,
the biases of technical change and the structure of the technology (scale
economies) were also incorporated. Finally, the efficiency change was
added, as its omission will lead to an overstatement of the unexplained
residual as well as to an erroneous allocation of productivity change to its
included sources (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003).
In our case, total factor productivity (TFP) is decomposed into three com-
ponents: technical change, technical efficiency change, and a scale effect.
To obtain estimates of productivity change and its components, a stochas-
tic frontier analysis (SFA) approach is applied. Aigner et al. (1977) and
Meeusen and Broeck (1977) independently proposed the SFA models. A
number of comprehensive reviews of literature on stochastic frontier es-
timation are available, including Førsund et al. (1980), Schmidt (1985),
Bauer (1990), Greene (1993) and Murillo-Zamorano (2004). The produc-
tion frontier has an error term with two components, one for random
effects beyond the control of the producer (weather, etc.) and another for
technical inefficiency, which is under the firm’s control. Specifically, the
stochastic production frontier is written as
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ln(yit) = f(xit, t; β) + vit − uit, i = 1, 2, . . . , t = 1, 2, . . . , (2.1)
where yit is the output of the i-th firm in the t-th year; xit denotes a (1×K)
vector of inputs; f(.) is a suitable functional form (e.g., translog); t is
a linear time trend representing technical change; β is a vector of un-
known parameters to be estimated; the vits are random errors, assumed
to be i.i.d. and have N(0, σ2v)-distribution, independent of the uits; and the
uits are the technical inefficiency effects. The rate of technical efficiency










According to Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003, p.283), a conventional Divisia
index of productivity change is defined in the scalar output case as the
difference between the rate of change of output and the rate of change of
an input quantity index, and so




where a dot over a variable indicates its rate of change [e.g., ẏ = (1/y)(dy/dt) =
dlny/dt], Sn = wnxn/E is the observed expenditure share of input xn,
E =
∑
nwnxn is total expenditure, and w = (w1, . . . , wN) > 0 is an in-
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put price vector. Hence, after some transformations, productivity change
can be decomposed as














ẋn + TE∆, (2.5)
where εn = εn(x, t; β) = xnfn(x, t; β)/f(x, t; β), n = 1, . . . , N , are elastic-
ities of output with respect to each of the inputs. The scale elasticity
ε = ε(x, t; β) =
∑
n εn(x, t; β) T 1 provides a primal measure of returns
to scale characterizing the production frontier. The relationship in the
equation (2.5) decomposes productivity change into a technical change
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In our case, as input price information or expenditure share of respective










ẋn] is not attainable, and the allocative inefficiency compo-
nent cannot be calculated empirically. An analysis of the development of
allocative inefficiency over time would be an interesting exercise, but it
is effectively prevented by the large role of centralized planning in the
early phase of our sample. With central planning, the available ‘mar-
ket’ prices do not adequately reflect economic scarcities, rendering the
observed prices unusable for the evaluation of allocative inefficiency. At
the same time, the degree of allocative inefficiency is expected to decrease
with pro-liberalization reforms. In addition, not only the short-run direc-
tion of reforms but also the medium-term stability is likely to improve
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allocative efficiency. Thus, in this study we assume that Sn = (εn/ε)∀n
and the decomposition in equation (2.5) can be simplified to






ẋn + TE∆. (2.6)
2.4 Data and empirical specification
2.4.1 Data description
The data series used for this empirical analysis are drawn from the “China:
government expenditure, growth, poverty, and infrastructure, 1952-2001”
datasets (2004),4 the China Statistical Yearbook (NBSC, various years),
the China Rural Statistical Yearbook (NBSC, various years), and the
China Education Expenditure Statistical Yearbook (NBSC, various years).
The dataset includes agricultural output and the conventional input se-
ries of 28 provinces for the period of reform in Mainland China from 1979
to 2008.5 In addition to this, a series of exogenous variables are incorpo-
rated that might be considered determinants of technical efficiency. Table
4We have benefited from the dataset provided by the International Food Policy Re-
search Institute (IFPRI). The “China: Government Expenditure, Growth, Poverty, and
Infrastructure, 1952-2001” dataset contains provincial-level data was compiled by the
International Food Policy Research Institute. The data were collected from various
sources such as China Statistical Yearbook (SSB, various years), China Rural Statis-
tical Yearbook (SSB, various years), China Fixed Asset Investment Yearbook (various
years), China Education Expenditure Statistical Yearbook (SSB, various years), Khan
(1997), Fan (1997), World Bank (2000), Chinese Agricultural Science and Technology
(1949-1989), China Transportation Yearbook (various years), as well as authors’ esti-
mations (Fan et al., 2002).
5Tibet is not included in the dataset because of the lack of data. Hainan and
Chongqing obtained their provincial status in 1988 and 1997, respectively. The sta-
tistical data are still incorporated in their original provinces (Guangdong and Sichuan,
respectively) for the reason of consistency.
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2.1 gives an overview of the data characteristics based on the six reform
phases mentioned above.
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of the sample
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Whole Sample Period (1979-2008, n = 840)
Output 187.02 175.67 6.18 1174.02
Labor 1119.77 892.47 47.79 4333.00
Land 5357.33 3443.01 295.00 16708.03
Fertilizer 113.44 103.59 3.00 601.70
Machinery 1886.41 2142.65 90.30 14081.63
Phase I (1979-1984, n = 168)
Output 81.31 58.40 6.18 257.79
Labor 1078.96 871.61 91.70 3871.20
Land 5188.19 3263.95 502.00 12173.00
Fertilizer 51.50 42.09 3.10 189.50
Machinery 791.29 560.44 90.30 2866.10
Phase II (1985-1989, n = 140)
Output 113.50 81.51 10.35 318.90
Labor 1102.49 902.74 76.20 4156.70
Land 5165.41 3331.04 500.47 12295.67
Fertilizer 72.79 56.10 3.00 227.50
Machinery 1196.37 891.81 119.70 4302.82
Phase III (1990-1993, n = 112 )
Output 142.78 100.59 12.10 440.43
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Descriptive statistics of the sample (continued)
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Labor 1200.64 979.26 63.00 4333.00
Land 5302.11 3364.55 543.47 12752.10
Fertilizer 102.32 77.36 5.30 355.00
Machinery 1410.03 1041.95 170.17 4717.46
Phase IV (1994-1997, n = 112)
Output 197.35 148.16 13.35 683.26
Labor 1155.06 921.43 62.70 4023.80
Land 5421.31 3497.70 535.80 16708.03
Fertilizer 131.37 98.99 6.10 386.70
Machinery 1798.54 1531.26 211.44 7796.91
Phase V (1998-2003, n = 168)
Output 250.80 182.25 14.99 823.10
Labor 1150.62 903.78 59.30 3755.60
Land 5534.22 3558.84 308.80 13684.40
Fertilizer 150.86 116.71 6.90 468.80
Machinery 2570.38 2499.51 153.20 11342.45
Phase VI (2004-2008, n = 140)
Output 337.97 248.07 30.80 1174.02
Labor 1056.04 800.63 47.79 3235.00
Land 5532.95 3672.19 295.00 14185.64
Fertilizer 178.04 134.05 6.60 601.70
Machinery 3521.25 3304.10 129.66 14081.63
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Note: units of the above variables are 100 millions of 1980 China Yuan (constant
price) for “Output”, 10000 people for “Labor”, 1000 hectares for “Land”, 10000
tons for “Fertilizer” and 10000 horsepower for “Machinery”, respectively.
Agricultural output values for all the years are calculated at constant
1980 prices.6 Inputs consist of four conventional categories: land, labor,
capital, and fertilizer. Land is measured as sown area for all crops in each
province. The amount of agricultural labor force is chosen to indicate the
labor input of each province. Machinery use is selected as a proxy for
capital input. Fertilizer use is measured in pure nutrients.7 In Figure
2.1, we have plotted the mean values of the output and the four inputs
for each year in the sample period, with vertical dashed lines separating
the six policy reform phases. Agricultural output continuously increased
during the whole period, indicating an overall growth in China’s agricul-
tural production since the start of the reforms. Agricultural labor has
remained almost unchanged but showed a trend of decrease over the last
three phases. This might coincide with the government’s policy of en-
couraging more rural labor mobility in recent years. Variation in sown
area is negligible for the whole period, which reflects the government’s
efforts on the policy aim of food security. Both fertilizer use and machin-
ery use increased steadily, indicating the strong development of China’s
6Agriculture consists of cropping, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery in China’s
statistics.
7In China rural statistical yearbook, chemical fertilizer use is measured as the ac-
tual quantity of chemical fertilizer used for agricultural production, including nitrogen,
phosphate, potash and compound fertilizer. The magnitude of Fertilizer use is calcu-
lated by the method that using pure nutrients, that is, the actual quantity of chemical
fertilizer multiplying the proportion of nitrogen, phosphorus pentoxide, and potassium
hydroxide in them. The formula is: Discounted scalar physical quantity = actual quan-
tity × percentage of the content in that fertilizer.
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Figure 2.1: Output and inputs in the whole sample period
Note: The mean value of the variables for each year has been converted to in-




2.4.2 Translog specification of the production fron-
tier
For our study, a translog specification of the production frontier is used.
The specified stochastic production frontier model is depicted as follows






2 + βAA [ln(Ait)]
2 + βKK [ln(Kit)]
2 + βFF [ln(Fit)]
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+ βLA ln(Lit) ln(Ait) + βLK ln(Lit) ln(Kit) + βLF ln(Lit) ln(Fit)
+ βAK ln(Ait) ln(Kit) + βAF ln(Ait) ln(Fit) + βKF ln(Kit) ln(Fit)





2 + vit − uit
i = 1, 2, . . . , N, t = 1, 2, . . . , T, (2.7)
where Yit =agricultural output for the i-th province in the t-th year;
Lit =land; Ait =labor; Kit =capital; Fit =fertilizer; t =a linear time trend;
the βs are unknown parameters to be estimated; the vit are random errors
assumed to be i.i.d. N(0,sv2v), and independent of the uit. The error terms
uit are non-negative random variables that account for technical ineffi-
ciency in production, obtained by truncating (at zero from below) random
variables from normal distributions with the mean mit and variance sv2u,
where
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Zit is a vector of exogenous variables used to explain variation in tech-
nical efficiency.8 Based on previous empirical research results and the
availability of data, our final choices are: rural electricity consumption
(elec), length of roads (road), rural education expenditures (redue), the
share of the rural labor force with a primary school education (primary),
a middle school education (middle), a high school education (high), a tech-
nical secondary school education (tech), and a college education (college),
respectively, where the share of the illiterate rural population is used as
a reference. In addition, three categories of dummy variables are intro-
duced to capture the effects of policy reform in the last three decades
and the impact of different regional development levels. Specifically, Pjs
reprensent aggregate reform policy effects in different phases, with the
first phase as a reference period. Two dummy variables (Sj) are incorpo-
rated to identify specific policy effects: the adoption of the voluntary pro-
curement contract for grain production in 1985, which became mandatory
again in 1986 to ensure food security; and the discontinuation of agricul-
tural tax starting in 2006, which is believed to be an important milestone
in China’s rural development. Rjs are five regional dummy variables
with the regional group of the three municipalities as a reference.9 Con-
8Four broad categories of variables usually used to explain differences in technical
efficiency: the development of infrastructure, the quality of management, the financial
conditions, and foreign competition (see Fried et al., 1993).
9We adopt the classification of regional groups for China’s provinces, municipalities
and autonomous regions developed by Territorial Development Service, OECD (2001),
which takes account not only of geographic location but also of the economic character-
istics shared by certain provinces.
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cerning our dataset, the three municipalities are Beijing, Tianjin, and
Shanghai; the six coast provinces are Hebei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian,
Shandong, and Guangdong; the three north-eastern provinces are Hei-
longjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning; the six center provinces are Shanxi, An-
hui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, and Hunan; the six north-western provinces
are Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang;
and the four south-western provinces are Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, and
Guangxi. δjs and θjs are unknown parameters to be estimated.
The variables elec, road, and redue are used to measure the impact of
the development of physical infrastructure. Improvements in rural in-
frastructure are expected to increase technical efficiency. The variables
regarding the share of the rural labor force with different educational
levels are used to capture the quality of the labor force. Since the share
of the illiterate rural labor force does not enter the function and is used
as an implicit reference, this vector of educational level variables is as-
sumed to be positively related to technical efficiency. The five policy re-
form dummy variables and the two specific policy dummy variables rep-
resent the effects of institutional arrangements that characterize differ-
ent policy reform phases and major economic events. Taking into account
the difference in the stages of development in various provinces, the five
regional dummy variables are included to distinguish the effect of the in-
stitutional environment that each regional group presents. The impact of
the three categories of dummy variables on technical efficiency depends
on empirical analysis, and we will discuss it in detail in the following
section. In order to avoid numerical difficulties in the maximum likeli-
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hood estimations and to facilitate the interpretation10 of the parameter
estimates, the output and the four inputs variables are divided by their
respective sample means and the time trend variable is scaled to have a
mean of zero.11
2.5 Empirical results and discussion
2.5.1 Description of the parameter estimates and hy-
potheses tests
The results of estimated parameters are presented in Table 2.2. It seems
that the specified translog production frontier model is acceptable given
the large share of significant parameters.
Several hypotheses tests have been conducted, and the results are shown
in the lower part of Table 2.2. The first one is that there are no technical
inefficiency effects in the model (H0 : γ = δj = θj = 0; H1 : γ > 0 and/or
at least one of the θj and δj are not equal to zero). Under H0, the gener-
alized likelihood-ratio statistic is asymptotically distributed as a mixture





χ21 (Coelli, 1995). In our case,
the critical value (α = 0.05, df = 22) is 33.33 (see Kodde and Palm, 1986,
Table 1). The calculated statistic value is 779.86, which is greater than
10At the sample mean, the transformed variables after taking logarithms take the
value zero. Hence, in the calculations of the elasticities, those terms involving the in-
puts for each observation vanish so that the first-order coefficients βi, i=L,A,K,F, can be
interpreted as elasticities at the sample mean.
11The results are generated using Ox version 6.10(see Doornik, 2007).
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Table 2.2: Parameter estimates of the stochastic production frontier
Coefficient Std.Err. Coefficient Std.Err.
Frontier function Inefficiency model
t 0.047*** 0.002 elec -0.003*** 0.000
ln(A ) 0.334*** 0.028 road -0.029*** 0.006
ln(L) -0.034 0.042 redue -0.017* 0.008
ln(F) 0.516*** 0.033 college -0.009 0.019
ln(K) 0.000 . tech -0.079*** 0.019
0.5t×t 0.004*** 0.001 high -0.032*** 0.008
0.5ln(A)×ln(A) 0.340*** 0.075 middle 0.004 0.003
0.5ln(L)×ln(L) 1.111*** 0.122 primary -0.023*** 0.003
0.5ln(F)×ln(F) 0.157*** 0.043 P1 0.326*** 0.079
0.5ln(K)×ln(K) 0.028 0.048 P2 0.675*** 0.085
t×ln(A) -0.006 0.004 P3 0.836*** 0.095
t×ln(L) 0.034*** 0.006 P4 1.070*** 0.106
t×ln(F) -0.029*** 0.004 P5 1.250*** 0.120
t×ln(K) -0.019*** 0.004 R1 0.179 0.104
ln(A)×ln(L) -0.479*** 0.059 R2 -0.100 0.105
ln(A)×ln(F) 0.026 0.055 R3 0.156 0.098
ln(A)×ln(K) 0.189** 0.057 R4 0.403*** 0.091
ln(L)×ln(F) -0.262*** 0.051 R5 0.414*** 0.107
ln(L)×ln(K) -0.561*** 0.089 S1 -0.271* 0.137
ln(F)×ln(K) 0.271*** 0.055 S2 0.321*** 0.055
intercept 0.116*** 0.027 intercept 0.651** 0.208
σ2v 0.009 0.001 σ2u 0.034 0.004
Log
likelihood




Results of the hypotheses tests (Wald and likelihood ratio (LR) tests)
Calculated test statistic χ2 critical value (α = 0.05)
1. There are no technical inefficiency effects in the model
LR = 779.86 χ2(22) = 33.33
2. Exclusion of the inputs of capital and land
Wald-χ2= 693.50 χ2(10) = 18.31
3. Globally constant returns to scale prevail for the model
LR = 244.11 χ2(6) = 12.59
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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the critical value. This indicates that the specified model, which incorpo-
rates the technical inefficiency component, is appropriate. The value of
γ (0.785) implies that, on average, 57.12% of the total variance is due to
the variance of the technical inefficiency term.12
The coefficients of ln(L) and ln(K), which present the respective output
elasticity of these two inputs at the sample mean, are not significantly
different from zero. We have therefore done the Wald test to see whether
the inputs of land and capital could be left out of the model without signif-
icantly reducing the fit of the model. The test statistic of 693.50 exceeds
the critical value of 18.31 (α = 0.05, df = 10), which indicates that these
variables should be included in the model.
Another hypothesis we are interested in is whether the production fron-
tier exhibits the property of globally constant returns to scale (CRTS). As
mentioned above, the TFP change in our case is decomposed into a tech-
nical change component, a scale component, and a technical efficiency
change component. If globally constant returns to scale prevail, the scale
effect drops out, and it is not necessary to calculate this component. The
calculated χ2 test statistic is 244.11, which is highly significant compared
with the critical value of 12.59 (α = 0.05, df = 6), so we can reject the null
hypothesis of globally CRTS.
Four inputs and time trend variables have been normalized by their re-
spective sample means in our specified translog model so that, on aver-
age, the coefficients of ln(A), ln(L), ln(F) and ln(K) show us the elasticity
12The variance of uit is equal to [(π − 2)/π]σ2u not σ2u , so the relative contribution of
the inefficiency effect to the total variance term is γ/[γ + (1− γ)π/(π − 2)] (Coelli et al.,
1998).
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of output with respect to each of the inputs at the sample mean and βt
denotes the average annual growth rate of technical change in the whole
research period. Fertilizer use is the most important input for agricul-
tural production in our model. A one percent increase in fertilizer use will
lead to a 0.516 percent increase in output. In addition, labor input also
contributes 33.4% to agricultural output growth. Both for land and cap-
ital, the first-order coefficients are not significantly different from zero,
i.e., they do not affect output significantly at the sample mean. However,
variable exclusion tests show that the exclusion of these variables is re-
jected. The sum of βA, βL, βF and βK presents a measure of the scale
elasticity of roughly 0.82 at the sample mean, indicating decreasing re-
turns to scale. The value of βt shows an average annual growth rate of
technical change at 4.7%, which is a sign of good improvement in terms
of technology over the last three decades.
In our model, 20 variables are included to explain the variation in techni-
cal inefficiency (see the right part of Table 2.2). The coefficients of rural
electricity consumption (elec), length of road (road), and rural education
expenditures (redue) are all significantly negative, i.e., they positively
affect technical efficiency, indicating the importance of infrastructure de-
velopment. Three of the five education-related variables (tech, high, and
primary) are significantly positively related to technical efficiency, con-
firming the a priori expectation of increasing technical efficiency with
improved education. The coefficients of five policy reform dummy vari-
ables (P js) are all significantly positive. The results show that, compared
with the implicit reference of the first phase, the reform policies in the
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following phases have negative effects on technical efficiency. Further-
more, judged by the value of these five coefficients, the negative effects
have been increasing with the ongoing reforms, confirming the downward
trend of technical efficiency level (see Figure 2.2). Among the coefficients
of the five regional dummy variables (Rjs), only the parameters for north-
western (R4) and south-western provinces (R5) are significant. The pos-
itive value of coefficients indicate the significantly negative regional ef-
fects on technical efficiency for these two western regions, compared with
the reference region of the three municipalities. The two specific pol-
icy dummy variables (Sj) are both significant. The negative value of S1
identifies the positive effects of the policy of adopting the voluntary pro-
curement contract for grain production in 1985. In contrast, the policy of
the discontinuation of agricultural tax starting in 2006 (S2) had negative
effects on technical efficiency. The main aim of this policy design and the
other corresponding policies was to increase farmers’ income and to elim-
inate the rural-urban divide in a social welfare concern. So our results
show that, besides this type of policy design, reform polices focusing on
the input factor market such as the reform in the household registration
system (hukou system) and the reform related to land rights, just like the
functioning of HRS in the first phase, need to be introduced or furthered
in order to improve technical efficiency.
2.5.2 Technical efficiency
After the estimation, the average technical efficiency for each year is
shown in Figure 2.2 at the national level and for each of the six regions.
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Figure 2.2: Average yearly degree of technical efficiency by regions, 1979-
2008
Note: The weighted mean values of technical efficiency for each year have been
calculated with each province’s contribution of agricultural output as weight.
Source: Own figure.
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The vertical dashed lines separate the six policy reform phases. At the
national average (the solid line), technical efficiency scores kept a high
level of around 0.94 during the first phase. After reaching the peak value
of 0.95 in 1985, technical efficiency dropped substantially in the second
phase. The trend of deterioration was stopped at the beginning of 1990s,
and the scores of technical efficiency have been relatively steady around
0.80 for the third and the fourth phases. Starting at the beginning of the
fifth phase, technical efficiency decreased again slowly. After reaching its
lowest value of 0.72 in 2006, technical efficiency increased continuously
in 2007 and 2008.
Relating these observed trends to agricultural policy reforms, the good
performance of technical efficiency in the first phase could be attributed
largely to the decentralization of the agricultural production system and
to the reforms of the agricultural procurement system, especially the im-
plementation of HRS. This institutional arrangement greatly motivated
agricultural production from farm households. The second phase was
designed to further liberalize the country’s agricultural pricing and mar-
keting systems, and at the same time the government wanted to retain
the level of grain production in order to ensure food security. These mul-
tifaceted concerns often led to contradictory and inconsistent policy im-
plementation. One example is the adoption of the voluntary procurement
contract for grain production in 1985, which became mandatory again in
1986 in order to ensure food security. Meanwhile, input prices increased
much faster than the government’s output procurement prices, raising
production costs. All of these factors led to the deterioration of technical
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efficiency in the second phase. During the third and fourth phases, the
government continued with the reforms of the procurement and market-
ing systems and raised procurement prices for grain enormously to in-
crease farmers’ incomes and to meet food security goals. As a result, the
decrease in technical efficiency stopped and the scores remained around
0.8 for these two phases. In response to the huge rural-urban divide,13
the government started to integrate rural development into its overall
economic reforms starting at the beginning of the fifth phase. A series of
rurally-targeted policies were implemented to increase farmers’ income
and to facilitate rural development (see section 2.2.1). In terms of their
impact on technical efficiency, these policies initially do not seem to have
substantial effects. However, the two consecutive increases in the techni-
cal efficiency scores at the end of the sample period is a sign that technical
efficiency is again improving gradually.
The performance of technical efficiency for the six regional groups is also
shown in Figure 2.2. The trend of divergence is obvious in the whole
sample period. Technical efficiency for the coast provinces has remained
high during all of the reform phases except for a small drop in the third
phase, which could reflect the impact of some local governments’ policies
of liberalizing both procurement and retail prices in local grain markets.
The performance of technical efficiency for the north-western provinces
is quite poor, and the gap between it and other regions is increasing as
reforms continue to be implemented. The average score dropped from
13Per capita income in urban areas was 1.85 times that in rural areas in the mid-
1980s, but by 2003 and 2004 the ratio had risen to 3.2, the highest over the whole
reform period (OECD, 2005).
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around 0.87 in the first phase to less than 0.38 in the sixth phase. An-
other region to which our attention has been drawn is the north-eastern
provinces. Its level of technical efficiency was very high among the six
regions in the first four phases. But its score decreased substantially by
0.27 in the fifth phase, and it now ranks second to last in the six regions.
The performance of the other three regional groups are relatively consis-
tent with that on the national average level.
2.5.3 TFP change and its decomposition
According to our analytical framework, TFP change is decomposed into
three components: technical change, a scale component, and technical ef-
ficiency change. Indices of these three components and TFP change have
been calculated and converted into cumulative (chained) indices, which
are reported in Table 2.3 and plotted in Figure 2.3 with vertical dashed
lines separating the six policy reform phases. We observe that the indices
of technical efficiency change are greater than 0.9 for the entire decade
of the 1980s, but the situation deteriorates consecutively in the follow-
ing four phases, with a decline in technical efficiency of 18.5% during the
sample period (1979-2008). On the contrary, technical change performs
quite well throughout the whole period, increasing steadily and reaching
a dramatic improvement of 360.5% over the 30-year period. Although the
hypothesis of globally CRTS does not hold, the total scale effects seem to
contribute in only a very limited manner to TFP change. The trend has
developed similarly to that of technical efficiency change. A slight decline
of 3.6% over the whole period indicates that the prevailing agricultural
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Table 2.3: TFP change and its decomposition, 1979-2008
Year TE change Technical change Scale effect TFP change
1979 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1980 0.985 1.037 1.002 1.023
1981 0.985 1.074 1.004 1.063
1982 0.990 1.114 1.005 1.109
1983 0.994 1.154 1.004 1.152
1984 1.003 1.197 1.003 1.205
1985 1.006 1.241 1.003 1.253
1986 0.976 1.292 1.004 1.265
1987 0.973 1.343 1.002 1.306
1988 0.946 1.402 1.001 1.323
1989 0.919 1.461 0.995 1.326
1990 0.862 1.534 0.986 1.295
1991 0.837 1.603 0.979 1.301
1992 0.836 1.680 0.974 1.348
1993 0.832 1.758 0.970 1.393
1994 0.833 1.838 0.967 1.437
1995 0.847 1.919 0.962 1.506
1996 0.853 2.029 0.955 1.589
1997 0.843 2.144 0.948 1.636
1998 0.816 2.267 0.944 1.655
1999 0.814 2.393 0.944 1.733
2000 0.805 2.537 0.943 1.804
2001 0.795 2.748 0.946 1.937
2002 0.780 2.938 0.947 2.015
2003 0.777 3.170 0.950 2.155
2004 0.789 3.382 0.951 2.316
2005 0.785 3.636 0.953 2.458
2006 0.761 3.921 0.959 2.547
2007 0.789 4.258 0.961 2.868
2008 0.815 4.605 0.964 3.220
Average annual growth rate (%)
Phase I 0.060 3.662 0.060 3.800
Phase II -2.236 4.164 -0.200 1.426
Phase III -1.174 4.648 -0.544 2.461
Phase IV 0.399 5.267 -0.659 4.418
Phase V -0.975 6.935 0.127 5.422
Phase VI 0.814 8.022 0.340 8.587
1979-
2008
-0.703 5.407 -0.126 4.115
Note: The weighted mean values of TFP change and its decomposition for each
year have been calculated with each province’s contribution of agricultral output
as weight. 44




Figure 2.4: TFP change and its decomposition by regions, 1979-2008
Source: Own figure.
production structure has a negative effect on TFP change in China. When
these three components are combined together, we observe a net cumu-
lated increase of 222% in TFP over the sample period.
To view and compare the trend of changes for different regional groups,
we have presented TFP change and its decomposition in the respective
regions in Figure 2.4. Since the cumulative indices are calculated in this
study, technical efficiency change in Figure 2.4 presents the same infor-
mation that technical efficiency does in Figure 2.2. The patterns of the
development of technical change are consistent for the six regional groups
with the only difference being the rate of increase. It is interesting to
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see that the rank of performance in terms of technical change for the
six regional groups is almost the opposite to that of technical efficiency
change. Unlike its poor performance in technical efficiency change, the
north-western provinces rank first in technical change, equivalent to a
tenfold increase in the TC index over the last three decades. Similarly,
the performance of technical change for the three municipalities and the
north-eastern provinces are quite good in contrast with their poor per-
formance in terms of technical efficiency change. Although it increases
by 163% over the whole sample period, technical change for the coast
provinces still comes in last among the six regional groups. The trend
of the scale effects for the six regional groups looks similar, too. Even
though the scale effects are small, the decreasing trend stopped at the
end of the fourth phase and started to increase slowly over the last two
phases. The trends in technical change dominated the development of
the TFP index. The gap between the three municipalities and the other
five regional groups increased substantially, which is mainly due to the
contribution of scale effects for the three municipalities.
The average annual growth rate of TFP change and its components with
respect to the six phases of the reform are further disaggregated in Ta-
ble 2.3. We can see that the indices of average annual growth rate for
technical efficiency change are consistent with what we have discussed
in section 2.5.2. The indices of average annual growth rate for techni-
cal change develop more steadily than the technical efficiency change in-
dices. The annual growth rate of technical change increases greatly from
the first phase (3.66%) until the last phase (8.02%). This development
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reflects the success of the government’s long-term efforts on investment
in agricultural technology and rural infrastructure. The indices of the
average annual growth rate for the scale effects have fluctuated during
the sample period, and the value is positive for the last two phases. The
indices of the average annual growth rate for TFP change have kept pace
with that of technical change over the whole period except for the second
and third phases, where the achievements of technical change are largely
offset by the poor performance in terms of technical efficiency change.
2.5.4 Analysis of annual average growth rate across
regions
In this section, we would like to compare the performance of TFP change
and its decomposition for each province within the six regional groups.
The annual average growth rate of TFP change and its three components
with respect to 28 provinces, municipalities, or autonomous regions14 for
the whole reform period have been calculated and presented in Table 2.4.
For the purpose of comparison, the rankings of these 28 provinces with
respect to annual average TFP change and its decomposition are also
shown in parentheses after each value of the growth rate in Table 2.4.
The annual average growth rate of technical efficiency change for the 28
provinces are in accordance with the regional performance of technical
efficiency discussed in section 2.5.2. Only six out of 28 provinces have
14For simplicity, the term ’provinces’ is used to refer to provinces, municipalities, or
autonomous regions in the following discussion.
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Table 2.4: Annual average growth rate of TFP change and its components
across regions, 1979-2008(%)
Region TE change Technical
change
Scale effect TFP change
Municipalities
Beijing -1.911 (15) 6.901 (11) -0.086 (12) 4.768 (10)
Tianjin -3.860 (27) 7.863 (9) -1.116 (28) 2.543 (24)
Shanghai -0.352 (8) 7.934 (8) 0.358 (3) 7.940 (1)
Coast
Hebei 0.063 (4) 3.011 (26) -0.642 (26) 2.414 (26)
Jiangsu 0.090 (3) 2.973 (27) 0.137 (8) 3.207 (22)
Zhejiang 0.020 (6) 4.586 (22) 0.164 (6) 4.779 (9)
Fujian -1.143 (12) 5.019 (18) 0.049 (10) 3.869 (15)
Shandong 0.157 (1) 1.973 (28) -0.272 (18) 1.855 (27)
Guangdong 0.107 (2) 3.751 (24) -0.263 (17) 3.588 (18)
North-East
Liaoning -0.869 (10) 4.942 (19) -0.234 (16) 3.787 (16)
Jilin -2.425 (16) 6.663 (12) -0.414 (22) 3.645 (17)
Heilongjiang -2.566 (19) 7.972 (6) 0.216 (4) 5.428 (7)
Centre
Shanxi -2.957 (25) 6.074 (15) -0.459 (24) 2.464 (25)
Anhui -0.873 (11) 4.486 (23) -0.154 (14) 3.414 (20)
Jiangxi -1.329 (14) 6.962 (10) 0.527 (1) 6.097 (4)
Henan -1.204 (13) 3.360 (25) -0.602 (25) 1.502 (28)
Hubei -0.489 (9) 4.930 (21) -0.145 (13) 4.265 (13)
Hunan -0.166 (7) 4.939 (20) -0.070 (11) 4.691 (12)
North-West
Inner Mongolia -2.751 (22) 9.026 (3) -0.279 (19) 5.731 (5)
Shaanxi -2.665 (20) 6.402 (14) -0.311 (20) 3.244 (21)
Gansu -2.842 (23) 8.039 (5) -0.198 (15) 4.761 (11)
Qinghai -4.129 (28) 11.023 (1) 0.148 (7) 6.597 (2)
Ningxia -3.693 (26) 9.436 (2) 0.079 (9) 5.477 (6)
Xinjiang -2.881 (24) 7.969 (7) -0.705 (27) 4.119 (14)
South-West
Guangxi -2.471 (18) 5.715 (16) -0.399 (21) 2.691 (23)
Sichuan 0.041 (5) 5.116 (17) 0.165 (5) 5.332 (8)
Guizhou -2.683 (21) 8.611 (4) 0.456 (2) 6.179 (3)
Yunnan -2.443 (17) 6.608 (13) -0.436 (23) 3.550 (19)
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experienced positive growth rate during the sample period. Five of them
belong to the coast province group. Although Fujian has a negative value,
its ranking is relatively high (12) among the 28 provinces. In contrast,
the performance of four south-western provinces and six north-western
provinces are very poor with the single exception of Sichuan. A large
amount of variation is observed for the municipality group, where Bei-
jing, Tianjin, and Shanghai rank 15th, 27th and 8th respectively. Hence,
the classification of the regional groups, with the exception of the munici-
pality group, is roughly consistent in terms of the performance of techical
efficiency change. The obvious gap between the western provinces and
the other regions implies that the government should take measures to
improve their technical efficiency in order to catch up with the production
frontier.
The annual average growth rate of technical change for the 28 provinces
again looks similar to the technical change pattern observed at the re-
gional level (see Figure 2.4). All provinces have experienced significant
technological progress albeit to a different extent. The six north-western
provinces and the six coast provinces have exchanged their positions in
comparison with their performance in terms of technical efficiency change.
For instance, Qinghai ranks first in technical change and last in technical
efficiency change, whereas Shandong does the opposite. Since the coast
provinces and the center provinces have already had a relatively high
level of agricultural production, the impressive performance of western
provinces is not unexpected. The development of technical change for all
provinces is also a result of the goverment’s long-term support in agricul-
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tural R&D.
In contrast to the performance of technical efficiency change and techni-
cal change, the pattern of the annual average growth rate of the scale
effects for the 28 provinces does not show any regional differences. Ten
provinces have positive growth rates and are dispersed throughout all of
the six regional groups. The fact that almost two-thirds of the provinces
have experienced negative growth rates in the scale effects suggests there
is still room for the structural adjustment of agricultural production.
The performance of the annual average growth rate of TFP change for
the 28 provinces is dominated by that of technical change. At the same
time, because of the existence of the opposite effect of technical efficiency
change for most of provinces, the variation of growth rate of TFP change
among the 28 provinces is not as great as that of technical change. The
value of the growth rate ranged from 7.94% for Shanghai to 1.50% for
Henan.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, we estimate productivity change in China’s agriculture
and decompose the observed TFP growth in order to evaluate the effects
of the government’s policy reform on agricultural production over the
last three decades. Total factor productivity (TFP) change is decomposed
into three components: technical efficiency change, technical change, and
scale effect. A translog production frontier model is applied to calculate
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indices of TFP change and its three components, with a specific focus on
explaining the variation in technical efficiency. We then evaluate and
discuss the impacts of the government’s policy reform on the changes in
productivity and efficiency during China’s rural reform period, which can
be roughly divided into six phases from 1979 to 2008.
Our results show that the best performance in terms of technical effi-
ciency is exhibited in the first phase (1979-1984). After reaching the peak
value of 0.95 in 1985, technical efficiency deteriorated substantially dur-
ing the second phase and remained at a lower level of about 0.80 for the
third and fourth phases. In the last two phases, technical efficiency ini-
tially continued to decrease but, after reaching its lowest value of 0.72 in
2006, it increased again in 2007 and 2008. Connecting the performance of
technical efficiency with the government’s agricultural policy in different
reform phases, we argue that the implementation of a new institutional
arrangement aiming at input factor market reform has contributed to the
high level of technical efficiency. A good example of this is the implemen-
tation of HRS in the first phase. HRS liberalized the rural labor force
and other production endowments, which greatly motivated agricultural
production. After the first phase, reform policies were mainly designed to
solve pricing and marketing problems without including further reform
of input markets. The effects of these policies have been illustrated by
poor performance of technical efficiency in the following phases. Hence,
in addition to the series of policy designs concerning rural social welfare
that aim to increase farmers’ income and to eliminate the rural-urban di-
vide, reform polices focusing on input factor market reform, such as the
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reform in household registration system (hukou) and the reform related
to land rights, need to be introduced or furthered in order to improve
technical efficiency.
From the analysis of TFP change and its decomposition, we find that
the impressive improvement of TFP change (222%) over the last three
decades is dominated by the good performance of technical change (360.5%).
At the same time, both technical efficiency change (-18.5%) and the scale
effects (-3.6%) have worked against the improvement in TFP change. In
the comparisons of regions and among provinces, we observe an obvious
trend of dispersion in technical efficiency change. The ever-growing gap
between the western provinces and the other regions suggests that agri-
cultural production for the western regional groups was not able to gradu-
ally catch up with the production frontier, and therefore more preferential
policies should be carried out in these regions to improve their technical
efficiency. The dramatic performance of technical change for all provinces
has reflected the success of the government’s long-term efforts on invest-
ment in agricultural technology and rural infrastructure. An interesting
finding is that the rank of performance in terms of technical change for
the six regional groups is almost the exact opposite to that of technical
efficiency change. Based on the fact that the coast provinces and the
center provinces have already experienced a relatively high level of agri-
cultural production, the impressive performance of the western provinces
is not unexpected. In contrast to technical efficiency change and techni-
cal change, the pattern of the annual average growth rate of the scale
effects for the 28 provinces does not show any regional differences. Ten
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provinces have positive growth rates and are dispersed throughout all of
the six regional groups. The fact that almost two-thirds of the provinces
have experienced negative growth rates in the scale effects suggests that
there is still room for the structural adjustment of agricultural produc-
tion.
Some limitations of our study arise from the quality of the available data,
the unavailability of important data series, and the overall aggregate na-
ture of the dataset. In aggregating the total agricultural output, using
constant prices as weights may be not appropriate, when considering that
the changes of relative output prices in China over time and across re-
gions always leads to a biased estimate of the growth rate. Based on the
question of accuracies in the livestock and fishery output in China’s offi-
cial statistics, Fan and Zhang (2002) constructs a Törnqvist-Theil index
using adjusted livestock and fishery output data and gets the result that
official output data tends to understate the regional development gap. As
for the choice of appropriate input proxies, the exclusion of the quantity of
manurial fertilizer in pure nutrients as a proxy for fertilizer use and num-
bers of draft animals for capital because of missing data for several of the
years examined are especially problematic. The last limitation is related
to the aggregate character of the dataset used in our study. A production
frontier is usually considered to be well-developed if using a more dis-
aggregate, farm-level data set, whereas an average provincial-level data
set is applied in our study. Since our results are consistent with that of
most other authors, our findings can still be considered robust. For future
research, this study could be refined and furthered with reconstructing
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aggregate agricultural output indices, choosing suitable proxies for agri-
cultural capital input, and using disaggregated farm household level data
set. Further research should focus on the estimation of impacts of factor
market reform policies on technical efficiency and productivity change,
and hence the rural income.
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Chapter 3
The impact of land
reallocation on technical
efficiency
The main contents of this chapter are based on the article “The impact
of land reallocation on technical efficiency : evidence from China”, and
this article is a cooperation with Xiaobing Wang, Thomas Glauben, and
Bernhard Brümmer. It has been accepted for publication in the journal
Agricultural Economics. It appears in print for issue 42(4), July 2011.
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3.1 Introduction
RURAL reform in transition economies, such as China, Vietnam, theformer Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe, involves substantial
changes in land institutions (e.g., Lerman et al., 2004). Induced by the
preexisting diversity and dimensions of land institutions, political pres-
sure toward land reform has widely differed across the countries and has
also fluctuated over time within countries. The success in the develop-
ment of Chinese agricultural production has been acknowledged to a se-
ries of radical land reforms (Fan, 1991; Lin, 1992; Huang and Rozelle,
1995). The core of these reforms is the coexistence of land ownership
remaining at the village level and land use rights being vested in house-
holds. This characteristic, on the one hand, motivates farmers to invest
in land. On the other hand, the rural households still face the potential
risk of land allocation, reallocation, and adjustment as deemed fit by the
local officials, typically at the village level. The initial duration of the
land allocation was 15 years, but it was extended in 1993 to another 30
years after the expiration of the land contract between farmers and the
local government.1
In the Chinese land tenure system, farmland is allocated equally based
on household size, household labor supply, or both. However, household
demographics or labor composition constantly change as a result of births
and deaths, aging, marriage, family separation, etc. Cultivated land per
1The starting point of the initial land tenure differs significantly across provinces
and even counties in the same province due to differences in the process of introducing
the household responsibility system (HRS).
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capita, which was already relatively limited, has declined further due to
population growth, urbanization, and industrialization over time. This
decline in per capita arable area was exacerbated by problems of land
degradation. Furthermore, although China has codified a robust frame-
work for the protection of land rights, such as the Land Management Law
(1998), the Land Contracting Law (2003), and the Property Law (2007),
knowledge and practical implementation of these rights are still lagging
behind in rural areas (Tan et al., 2008; Jin and Deininger, 2009). The
top-down changes to legal and political structures did not solve China’s
continued struggles with unrest resulting from the appropriation of land
by developers and local officials (Kung, 2002). Farmers in many areas
are still being forced to relocate by local officials, often illegally, and local
cadres still retain large amounts of money intended to be distributed to
farmers as compensation for any public-interest land seizures.
The issues related to land reallocation have received special attention by
economists and policy makers. Some of the existing literature focused on
land reallocation policies associated with the land tenure system and the
effects these policies have on land security (Liu et al., 1998; Brandt et al.,
2002; Tan et al., 2006). Liu et al. (1998) used village-level data to ana-
lyze the frequency of land reallocation and its difference across villages.
Brandt et al. (2002) concluded that land tenure security is influenced by
land reallocation through the frequency and the extent to which house-
holds have been targeted. Tan et al. (2006) used land reallocation as one
subgroup of independent variables to find the determinants of land frag-
mentation and, in turn, its effects on agricultural productivity.
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In addition, some authors explored the impacts of land reallocation on
investment and other factor markets such as the land rental market. Li
et al. (1998) and Jacoby et al. (2002)concluded that land insecurity, which
arose from the frequency of land reallocation, dampened farmer incen-
tive to invest in the land, especially via the use of organic fertilizers to
improve the soil fertility. Kung (2002) identified a positive relationship
between the size of the reallocated land and the demand of land rented;
hence, land reallocation was found to serve as a complement of the land
rental market in improving the allocation of land.
Other studies aimed to improve understanding of the determinants and
extent of land reallocation at different levels because it is well observed
that land has been reallocated or adjusted during the legal contract pe-
riod of 15 and even 30 years later. Kung (2000) found that the incidence
of land reallocation has been significantly influenced by the land endow-
ment, off-farm income opportunities, as well as population growth rate of
the village. This conclusion is consistent with the finding of Yao (2000b),
who provided evidence on the interaction of land reallocation, in magni-
tude and frequency, with income levels and the endowment of local land
resources. Brandt et al. (2002) concluded that the scope and duration
of the dependence of land reallocation is sensitive to the availability of
off-farm employment. These studies used either village level data (Kung,
2000; Yao, 2000b) or household level data (Brandt et al., 2002) to elab-
orate the relationship between land reallocation and its determinants.
Because the data set used in our study contains both village level and
household level information, it provides us with an opportunity to simul-
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taneously study land reallocation at the farm household level, as well as
the potentially important factors at the village level.
A successful transition process in agriculture requires inter alia improve-
ments in productivity and in efficiency, as well as functioning input mar-
kets in order to make full use of scarce resources (Swinnen and Rozelle,
2006). Given that Chinese agricultural production is still largely based
on household-level production with a low land/labor ratio, and that rural
households are heavily dependent on land as the main income source, the
frequency and scope of land reallocation affects how the land is used. In
this sense, land reallocation, which usually takes places independently
from the consent of the farm household, can be expected to lead to a vari-
ation in productivity and efficiency in several dimensions. On the one
hand, frequent land reallocation and adjustment dampen the incentive of
household investment on land, as well as the efficiency of organizing the
farm structure in the long-run. On the other hand, land reallocation and
adjustment, which is a common means of shifting land between house-
holds, is a potential instrument to achieve efficient allocation of land re-
sources. To date, few studies have provided an empirical analysis of the
impacts of land reallocation on the efficiency and output of agricultural
production in China.
The overall goal of this chapter is to contribute to the ongoing assess-
ment of land reallocation. Special attention is given to its effects on the
efficiency and output of agricultural production across the provinces with
very different resource endowments and technology levels. It is specif-
ically based on a panel data set of household and village surveys con-
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ducted in three provinces by the Ministry of Agriculture from 1995 to
2002. We first give a descriptive overview of the extent to which land
reallocation occurs in rural China. Second, an instrumental-variables
(IV) estimation of a fixed-effects model is implemented to identify the
main determinants of land reallocation in rural China. Finally, we use a
stochastic frontier production function to examine how land reallocation
influences technical efficiency and production of individual farms.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the
conceptual framework and econometric model. Section 3.3 describes the
incidence of land reallocation at the village level and presents the de-
scriptive statistics of the variables used in empirical estimations. Section
3.4 presents the empirical results. The final section concludes.
3.2 Conceptual framework and econometric
model
3.2.1 Conceptual framework
Land reallocation is common in rural China, and motivations for the re-
allocation differ among provinces and villages within a province (Brandt
et al., 2002). The occurrence of land reallocation for our research con-
sists of the following: first, the second round of land allocation connected
to the extension of land contracts for another 30 years at the end of the
1990s; second, village cadres periodically taking back and redistributing
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farm land, due to a demographic change in the household based on egal-
itarian rule; and third, the expropriation of land either for non-farming
purposes or collective production and the corresponding compensation of
land afterward. The existing literature concerning the determinants of
land reallocation shows that the frequency and scope of land reallocation
is affected by the demographic change in the village; differential access to
off-farm and self-employment opportunities; income level of the village;
change of land endowment in the village, such as land per capita; and the
functioning of the land rental market (Yao, 2000b; Tan et al., 2006). In
addition, farm and household characteristics, such as the demographic
change of the household, might affect land reallocation.
Among these factors affecting land reallocation, we focus in particular on
the following questions because of their important implications for future
policy reforms. First, does demographic change play a crucial role in land
reallocation? The framework of household responsibility system (HRS)
contains two general principles related to land allocation: equal access
to land and 15 year (extended to 30 years in the second round of land
allocation) duration of land contract. With demographic change ongoing
in the village, village leaders are under the pressure of land realloca-
tion for egalitarian reason. If village leaders decide to reallocate without
much regard to the land contract, which is common in most villages, the
scope of the reallocation could be either village-wide or restricted to a se-
lected number of farm households within the village. The latter form is
more frequently documented in the literature (Kung, 2000; Brandt et al.,
2002). Even though the 1998 Land Management Law constrains land re-
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allocation to cases of demographic changes at the household level, some
villages seem not to strictly follow this rule. Hence, variables indexing
both village level and household demographic change will be introduced
in our model to capture their impact on land reallocation.
Second, are land rental markets a substitute for or a complement of land
reallocation? Brandt et al. (2002) argue that administrative reallocations
are a substitute for the exchange of land that would occur if households
rented land to each other because farm rental markets are incomplete or
relatively thin. In contrast, Kung (2002) identifies a positive relationship
between the size of the reallocated land and the demand of land rented,
which implies that land reallocation is a complement of the land rental
market. He suggests that the local off-farm economy is developing so
rapidly that the mere reallocation of land via administrative means is
insufficient to cope with the structural transformation of the economy.
Third, how does central government policy affect the determinants and
impacts of reallocation? For instance, the Land Management Law (1998)
and the Land Contracting Law (2003) both attempt to increase land tenure
security for farm households and strengthen their rights to land. The
forces behind the implementation of these policy arrangements in prac-
tice are also an area of our research interest. Thus, in our empirical work,
we have assumed that social and economic development of the villages,
household and farm characteristics, and relevant policy effects determine
the incidence of land reallocation.
There are quite a few studies that evaluate the productivity and techni-
cal efficiency of Chinese agricultural production (Lin, 1992; Huang and
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Figure 3.1: Assumed relationships in the two stages model
Source: Own figure.
Rozelle, 1995; Brümmer et al., 2006). To the best of our knowledge, how-
ever, few of them have empirically assessed the influence of land real-
location on the productivity and technical efficiency in China or even in
other transition countries. In this study, conventional physical inputs,
including cultivated land; labor; capital; expense on intermediate inputs,
such as fertilizer, seed, etc.; and the predicted value of land reallocation
attained from the stage 1 model, associated with other control variables,
are used to estimate the stochastic frontier production function and the
calculation of farm technical efficiency. The hypothesized relationships
are shown in Figure 3.1 .
The three provinces in our study are characterized by differences in re-
source endowments and in levels of economic development. Hence, it is
interesting to compare the determinants of land reallocation across the
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provinces and, in particular, the effects of the land rental market. Al-
though land leasing has been legally sanctioned and encouraged by the
government, the extent of progress of the land rental market is different
across China. However, whether it complements or substitutes for ad-
ministrative land reallocation is an empirical question to explore, when
regional characteristics are taken into account. The conceptual frame-
work indicates that administrative land reallocation influences house-
hold agricultural production, not vice versa, because in most Chinese vil-
lages, the frequency and magnitude of land reallocation is determined by
village leaders and the influence of an individual farm is limited. The
impacts of administrative land reallocation on technical efficiency need
elaborate inspection. On the one hand, if frequent reallocation of land is
detrimental to output by dampening the incentive of farmers in produc-
tion, future reforms should be oriented to guarantee land security. On the
other hand, land reallocation could also optimize the allocation of land re-
sources because of incomplete development of the land rental market in
some regions. Thus, the direction and magnitude of the impact of land
reallocation on production and efficiency should be determined based on
an empirical analysis.
3.2.2 Econometric model
According to the conceptual framework listed in Figure 3.1, we apply the
following two-stage model to analyze the determinants of land realloca-
tion and its impact on farm production in rural China.
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Stage 1: Fixed-effects model2 with instrumental variables (IV) es-
timation
Yit = αZit + θLit + ci + εit (3.1)
Cov(Lit, εit) 6= 0 (3.2)
Cov(Iit, εit) = 0 (3.3)
Cov(Lit, Iit) 6= 0 (3.4)
In Equation (3.1), Yit is a proxy for land reallocation for household i at
time t as shown. Zit is a vector of exogenous variables that describe the
social and economic development of a village, the household and farm
characteristics, and relevant state policy variables. Lit represents poten-
tially endogenous variables that might be correlated with εit∼ N(0, σε),
the random error term in Equation (3.1). Iit are excluded instrumental
variables that do not appear as regressors in Equation (3.1), are uncorre-
lated with εit in Equation (3.3), and possibly correlated with Lit in Equa-
tion (3.4). α and θ are the associated vectors of the parameters to be es-
2The Breusch-Pagan test and the Hausman test are used to compare random-effects
and fixed-effects specifications. The resulting Chi-squared statistic strongly rejects the
random effects model at the 1% significance level, suggesting that the unobserved fac-
tors are correlated with the explanatory variables in the estimations.
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timated. ci represents the unobserved time-invariant household effects.3
All estimations are carried out with Stata (Version 10.0), using cluster-
robust estimates of the variance-covariance matrices (Schaffer, 2007).
Stage 2: Normal/Half-normal Stochastic Frontier Production
Qit = f(Xit, T ; β) + vit − uit (3.5)
uit∼ N+(0, σuit) = N+(0, σuerJit) (3.6)
Where Qit represents the value of aggregated farming4 output for farm i
in year t, f(Xit; β) is a suitable production function form (a translog speci-
fication in our study), Xit is the vector of conventional inputs, T is a linear
time trend to capture technological progress, andβ is the associated vec-
tor of technology parameters to be estimated. vit is a random error term
assumed to be i.i.d. N(0, σv). The error terms uit are nonnegative random
variables that account for technical inefficiency in production. They are
half-normally distributed with the location parameter µ set equal to zero,
and parameter σ2uit to be estimated. This error term uit is allowed to be
heteroscedastic by introducing a multiplicative relationship between the
variables Jit responsible for heteroscedasticity and the common distribu-
tion parameter σu (Equation (3.6)). Jit can be interpreted as a vector of
variables used to explain variation in technical inefficiency. In particu-
3These effects include location of the household and farm, the quality level of farm
land, etc.
4Farming output includes (1) grain crops, cash crops, and other crops; (2) fruits, silk-
worm cocoon, tea, crude drugs, and vegetables.
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lar, we also include the predicted value of the change in arable land (due
to land reallocation) from stage 1 of the model. γ is the associated pa-
rameter vector of the determinants of technical inefficiency that is to be
estimated.
3.3 The incidence of land reallocation and
data description
The database used in this study is drawn from a fixed-point survey data
series across Zhejiang, Hubei, and Yunnan provinces conducted annu-
ally by Research Center for Rural Economy (RCRE), China. The three
provinces were chosen to reflect the diversity of China’s agricultural pro-
duction. Zhejiang province is one of the richest Chinese provinces in the
East, Hubei province represents the central middle-income region, and
Yunnan province belongs to West China and is one of the poorest regions
in the country.5 The sample collection proceeds in a stratified way for
the village data. After that, the household data of the respective villages
are randomly selected. Initially, every county is stratified by annual net
income per capita into upper, middle, and lower groups (Benjamin et al.,
2005). Representative villages in each group are then chosen according
to geographic (plain, hilly, or mountainous area), location (city, suburb,
or not), and economic characteristics. We use individual household data
5Per capita Gross Regional Product in 2004 amounts to 23,942 RMB, 10,500 RMB
and 6,733 RMB, respectively (NBSC, 2006).
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and the associated village data covering the period from 1995 to 2002.6
The data constitute a balanced panel at the village level, with nine vil-
lages in Zhejiang, fifteen villages in Hubei, and five villages in Yunnan.
At the household level, the data set is unbalanced; on average, there are
204 households per year in Zhejiang, 606 in Hubei, and 283 in Yunnan
in the data set. The individual household data contains detailed infor-
mation on agricultural production operations and farm features, as well
as personal and household characteristics. The village data reflects the
village’s characteristics and its social and economic development.
Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics on land reallocation and land
rental markets over the sample period. Land reallocation is quantita-
tively measured as area of changed arable land of the farm household
due to land reallocation within a year. We illustrate the distribution of
the reallocation at the village level over time, and the number of villages
with respect to their aggregate land reallocation in three categories over
the sample period is counted here. The result shows roughly half of the
village observations have experienced significant loss of arable land dur-
ing land reallocation. It at least certifies a decrease of arable land at the
village level. Sample mean values for the three provinces are reported
here; summary statistics by year did not reveal any obvious trend. In
general, land reallocation or adjustment occurred in almost all the sam-
pled villages more than once in the period from 1995 to 2002. On aver-
age, 18.09% of households had their land reallocated in Zhejiang, 15.47%
6A one-year lag of input variables is used as excluded instrumental variables in the
stage 1 model, so the 1995 data was automatically dropped out. The estimated results







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































in Hubei, and 11.82% in Yunnan. This also implies that in all three
provinces land reallocation in most cases is probably not a village-wide
reallocation but a partial adjustment. As to the magnitude of land real-
location, gained land due to land reallocation is 1.26 mu per household
in Zhejiang, 1.28 mu per household in Hubei, and 1.12 mu per household
in Yunnan. Lost land due to land reallocation is 1.19 mu per household
in Zhejiang, 1.48 mu per household in Hubei, and 1.36 mu per household
in Yunnan. However, when compared with the average land endowment
of the farm households, the different relative impacts of land reallocation
on land endowment become obvious. A farm household in Zhejiang on
average has arable land 2.16 mu, while the quantity is 4.08 mu in Hubei
and 6.64 mu in Yunnan. Reallocated land accounts for more than half of
that farm household’s arable land in Zhejiang, and that is roughly one-
third in Hubei, and one-sixth in Yunnan. Land rented out is on average
0.13 mu per household in Zhejiang, 0.06 mu per household in Hubei, and
0.07 mu per household in Yunnan. Land rented in is on average 0.17 mu
per household in Zhejiang, 0.06 mu per household in Hubei, and 0.06 mu
per household in Yunnan. Land rental activities are much more impor-
tant in Zhejiang than in the other two provinces. Figure 3.2 presents a
kernel density estimate of arable land changes due to land reallocation by
provinces from 1996 to 2002. There is not much difference in the distribu-
tion for the three provinces. Zhejiang shows the narrowest distribution of
land being reallocated, while there was a comparatively larger variation
in land reallocation in Hubei and Yunnan. There is a relatively fatter
left-side tail in Yunnan, reflecting a comparably severe loss of land due
to land reallocation for farmers.
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Figure 3.2: The kernel density of changed arable land due to land reallo-
cation by provinces (1996-2002)
Note: Observations with zero value of changed arable land due to land realloca-
tion are not accounted in the figure.
Source: Own figure.
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According to our conceptual framework, the following factors that affect
land reallocation are introduced into the stage 1 model. Variables that
reflect the social and economic development of the village include annual
net income per capita representing the economic conditions of the village;
birth and death rate of the village, share of people who migrated into and
out of the village (with change of the location of household registration)
within the year, which are controlling for effects of demographic change;
share of arable land rented out during the year used as the proxy of the
land rental market in the local village; area of arable land per capita,
which index land endowment of the village; share of households doing
business outside the village, and the number of enterprises in the vil-
lage by end of year, signaling the availability of off-farm employment and
income opportunities (one-year lag of these two variables has been used
as excluded instruments in the estimation considering the potential en-
dogeneity problem). In addition, two household level variables, number
of rural permanent residents and sown area of arable land, are used to
capture the effects of household and farm characteristics on land realloca-
tion. Taking into account the potential endogeneity problem of the sown
area of arable land, a lag of one period for the production input factors
of labor, land, intermediate input, and capital are introduced as excluded
instruments. Furthermore, six yearly dummy variables are included to
capture the impact of state policy on land reallocation, with the year 1996
as the reference period.7
For the stage 2 model, the farming output is measured as an aggregate
7Data for the year 1995 was dropped because one period of lagged variables is used.
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value for grain crops, cash crops, other crops, fruits, silkworm cocoon, tea,
crude drugs, and vegetables. The four conventional input variables are
labor, land, intermediate input, and capital. Labor input is the total an-
nual working days allocated to planting production. The total sown area
for grain crops, cash crops, and other crops is used for the land variable.
The intermediate input sums up the purchase value of seeds, fertilizer,
agricultural diesel oil, plastics, and pesticides used in agricultural pro-
duction. Capital is measured as the total original value of fixed-capital
assets for agricultural production at the end of the year, and includes
draught animals, production tools, and machinery. In addition, a linear
time trend variable is introduced to capture changes in technology. Mon-
etary values for all variables are deflated with respect to 1995 constant
prices.
Variables explaining the variation in technical inefficiency consist of the
predicted value of changed arable land due to land reallocation obtained
from the stage 1 estimation. The predicted value is separated into two
new variables (with positive and negative values retained respectively)
that measure the effects of gaining or losing arable land due to land re-
allocation on technical inefficiency. We allow the two effects on techni-
cal inefficiency to be different in direction and/or in magnitude. Other
variables include a dummy variable with value 1 if any of the household
members is a township or village cadre, and otherwise 0; the share of ru-
ral laborers with primary school education, secondary school education,
high school education, and above (share of illiterate rural laborers as ref-
erence) in a household; the share of rural laborers licensed with profes-
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sional titles; and the share of plots with size between 0.5-1 mu,8 1-2 mu,
2-3 mu, 3-4 mu, 4-5 mu, and larger than 5 mu (share of plots with size
smaller than 0.5 mu is used as a reference for this category).
In Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 , the descriptive statistics of the variables are
listed for the stage 1 and stage 2 models, respectively. From the statistics,
we observe very different characteristics and social and economic devel-
opment levels at both the household and village level across the three
provinces. The share of arable land rented out in the village, which is a
proxy for the role of activities on the land rental market, is on average
8.109% in Zhejiang, while only 1.255% in Hubei and 2.316% in Yunnan.
These values confirm the judgment of relatively big differences in the de-
velopment of the land rental market across the regions.
In order to avoid numerical difficulties in the maximum likelihood esti-
mations, and to facilitate the interpretation of the parameter estimates,
the output variable and the four input variables are divided by their re-
spective sample means; the time trend variable is scaled to have a mean
of zero. Hence, estimated first-order parameters of the translog produc-
tion frontier can be estimated as elasticities at the point of normalization,
i.e., at the sample mean.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.4.1 Fixed-effects model with instrumental variables
estimations
Before presenting the main results, we give an overview of selected diag-
nostic tests in the lower half of Table 3.4.




Income_pc 0.014 (0.020) -0.046 (0.056) 0.446*** (0.100)
Birth 0.004 (0.005) 0.010 (0.006) -0.007 (0.004)
Death -0.008 (0.008) 0.011 (0.007) -0.006 (0.008)
Migr_in -0.012 (0.030) 0.122* (0.061) -0.303** (0.093)
Migr_out -0.000 (0.002) 0.027 (0.024) 0.178 (0.108)
Land_pc 1.273 (0.954) 0.186 (0.720) 3.083* (1.234)
Land_pc2 -0.362 (0.445) 0.280 (0.335) -0.335** (0.127)
Land_rent -0.005 (0.003) -0.029* (0.012) -0.005 (0.010)
Business 0.008 (0.004) -0.081** (0.028) 0.012 (0.048)
Enterprise -0.000 (0.002) 0.038** (0.013) 0.006 (0.004)
D_1997 -0.005 (0.048) 0.062 (0.053) -0.079 (0.042)
D_1998 -0.049 (0.057) -0.179* (0.072) -0.061 (0.062)
D_1999 0.065 (0.049) -0.136* (0.061) -0.368*** (0.078)
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Determinants of land reallocation with fixed-effects
models (continued)
Zhejiang Hubei Yunnan
D_2000 -0.141* (0.064) -0.180* (0.073) -0.164 (0.094)
D_2001 -0.068 (0.072) -0.171* (0.074) -0.247** (0.094)
D_2002 -0.226* (0.092) -0.064 (0.080) -0.313** (0.099)
Residents 0.006 (0.024) 0.218*** (0.050) 0.046* (0.019)
Land_sown -0.035 (0.022) -0.174*** (0.039) 0.004*** (0.001)
N 1619 4834 2238
F statistic F (18, 1313) = 2.74 F (18, 3989) = 1.65 F (18, 1845) = 6.29
P-value <0.001 0.041 <0.001
sigma_u 0.403 0.903 1.484
sigma_e 0.491 0.800 0.525
rho 0.403 0.560 0.889
Model diagnostics: results of hypothesis tests with fixed-effects IV estimation
1. Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors
H0: Land_sown can actually be treated as exogenous
χ2 χ2(1) = 19.676 χ2(1) = 47.411 χ2(1) = 3.099
P-value <0.001 <0.001 0.078
H0: Business can actually be treated as exogenous
χ2 χ2(1) = 1.080 χ2(1) = 10.051 χ2(1) = 1.781
P-value 0.299 0.002 0.182
H0: Enterprise can actually be treated as exogenous
χ2 χ2(1) = 0.051 χ2(1) = 0.847 χ2(1) = 12.081
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Determinants of land reallocation with fixed-effects
models (continued)
Zhejiang Hubei Yunnan
P-value 0.822 0.358 <0.001
2. IV redundancy test (LM test of redundancy of specified instruments)
H0: Instruments of lagged labor, intermediate and capital input are redundant
χ2 χ2(3) = 5.424 χ2(6) = 17.841
P-value 0.143 0.007
3. Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic)
H0: The specified model is underidentified
χ2 χ2(1) = 6.095 χ2(4) = 67.201 χ2(1) = 30.918
P-value 0.014 <0.001 <0.001
4. Overidentification test of all instruments (Hansen J statistic)
H0: Instruments used in the model are valid instruments
χ2 χ2(3) = 0.907
P-value 0.824
Note: Land_pc2 is the square of arable land per capita (Land_pc).
Standard errors are given in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
We first test the endogeneity of the potentially endogenous regressors.
The test statistics suggest that share of households doing business out-
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side the village (Business) and number of enterprises in the village (En-
terprise) both can be treated as exogenous in Zhejiang, whereas Business
is endogenous in Hubei, and Enterprise is endogenous in Yunnan; the
cultivated area of arable land can actually be treated as exogenous in
Yunnan, while an endogenous regressor problem exists in Zhejiang and
Hubei. In addition, we perform the IV redundancy test for Zhejiang and
Hubei to identify whether the excluded instruments for lagged labor and
intermediate and capital inputs are redundant. The results show that
these variables are redundant only for Zhejiang. The results of the under-
identification and overidentification tests of all the instruments are also
listed in Table 3.4. Finally, we examine whether the fixed effects model
or random effects model is to be used for the estimations. The resulting
Chi-square statistics from both the Breusch-Pagan test and the Hausman
test strongly reject the random effects model at the 1% significance level,
suggesting that the unobserved fixed effects are likely correlated with the
explanatory variables in the estimations.
The upper half of Table 3.4 reports the estimated results. Demographic
change has no effect on land reallocation in Zhejiang, whereas it does
impact land reallocation in Hubei and Yunnan. The number of rural per-
manent residents in the household (Residents) significantly positively af-
fects land reallocation in Hubei and Yunnan, indicating that demographic
change within a farm household is one important factor for land adjust-
ments in the village. This is consistent with the initial land allocation
policies implemented in rural China, according to which land allocation
to the households should be mainly based on numbers of rural residents
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or rural laborers (Liu et al., 1998; Brandt et al., 2002). Among the vil-
lage level variables that represent demographic change, only the share of
people who migrated into the village (Migr_in) is significant. The positive
sign of the coefficient in Hubei might indicate that there exists some flexi-
bility with regard to preserved arable land (jidong tian in Chinese), which
can be allocated to the newcomers, while the situation might be contrary
in Yunnan, judged from the negative parameter estimate of Migr_in for
this province. Share of arable land rented out (Land_rent), which is a
proxy of the development of the land rental market, has negative effects
on land reallocation in all three provinces; however, the coefficients are
insignificant in Zhejiang and Yunnan. We thus find at least for Hubei
that the land rental market acts as a substitute for administrative land
reallocation in optimizing land resources among farm households. The
economic conditions of the village (Income_pc) positively affect land re-
allocation only in Yunnan, but their effect is not significant in Zhejiang
and Hubei. Although the coefficients of arable land per capita (Land_pc)
and its square (Land_pc2) are not significant in Zhejiang and Hubei re-
spectively, the Wald test shows that they are jointly significant in both
provinces. The estimates for the three provinces are in accordance with
previous research results that abundant land resources facilitate more
intensive land reallocation in the village. Off-farm employment oppor-
tunities, as measured by the share of households doing business outside
the village (Business) and the number of enterprises in the village (En-
terprise), only affect land reallocation in Hubei, while they have no effect
in Zhejiang and Yunnan. The negative coefficient estimate for Business
in Hubei suggests that off-farm income opportunities alleviate the pres-
82
sure of requests for land during land adjustments. The positive estimate
for the parameter on Enterprise could be explained by the fact that a
fraction of farm households quit agricultural production and work in the
enterprises located in the village and, as a result, farm households that
stay in agriculture obtain the extra land reallocated from those who exit.
Farm size (Land_sown) only affects land reallocation in Hubei and Yun-
nan. The impact is negative in Hubei and positive in Yunnan, which
implies the different effects of land/labor ratio within farm households
for these two provinces. The sign of the majority of yearly dummy vari-
ables are negative and some of them become statistically significant from
1998 on in all the three provinces, implying that land tenure, to a large
extent, has been secured after the announcement of the extension of the
land use right for another 30 years.
3.4.2 The SFA production function
The translog stochastic frontier production function is estimated in the
stage 2 model. Several hypotheses regarding the specification have been
tested first. Our results reject the hypothesis that a Cobb-Douglas fron-
tier, with its implicit strong assumptions, e.g., constant partial produc-
tion elasticities and unit elasticity of substitution between the inputs, is
an adequate representation of the agricultural production in the three
provinces. The null hypothesis of no technical inefficiency effects in the
model is also rejected, indicating that the technical inefficiency term should
be considered in the estimations of the technology.
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Table 3.5 presents estimates of the parameters for the translog produc-
tion function. Over the study period, average technical change is esti-
mated at a yearly rate of 1.6% in Hubei. Insignificant technical progress
is observed on average in Zhejiang, while there seems to be technical
regress at the sample mean in Yunnan, as implicated by the significantly
negative coefficient for the linear time trend. The overall model qual-
ity, as judged by the t-ratios, seems satisfactory. All the first-order co-
efficients of the inputs have the expected signs, thus indicating positive
partial production elasticities at the sample mean.
Table 3.5: Estimated results from the translog




t 0.025 (0.013) 0.016*** (0.004) -0.029*** (0.007)
ln(a) 0.510*** (0.054) 0.073*** (0.020) 0.088** (0.033)
ln(l) 0.211*** (0.044) 0.505*** (0.022) 0.155*** (0.028)
ln(i) 0.247*** (0.051) 0.253*** (0.014) 0.367*** (0.020)
ln(k) 0.026 (0.017) 0.000 (.) 0.099*** (0.019)
t× t -0.012 (0.006) -0.014*** (0.004) 0.003 (0.005)
0.5ln(a)×
ln(a)
0.190*** (0.046) 0.152*** (0.038) 0.072 (0.055)
0.5ln(l)×
ln(l)
0.013 (0.031) 0.250*** (0.051) -0.114*** (0.024)
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Estimated results from the translog stochastic fron-





0.110* (0.050) 0.030 (0.017) 0.054*** (0.013)
0.5ln(k)×
ln(k)
0.011 (0.007) 0.006 (0.006) 0.018 (0.014)
t× ln(a) 0.007 (0.011) -0.001 (0.007) 0.014 (0.010)
t× ln(l) 0.012 (0.011) -0.023** (0.008) -0.049*** (0.009)
t× ln(i) 0.006 (0.011) 0.034*** (0.006) -0.018*** (0.005)
t× ln(k) -0.014*** (0.004) -0.001 (0.003) -0.009 (0.005)
ln(a)×
ln(l)
0.005 (0.030) -0.242*** (0.034) 0.035 (0.036)
ln(a)×
ln(i)
-0.208*** (0.039) 0.005 (0.025) -0.035 (0.024)
ln(a)×
ln(k)
0.019 (0.013) -0.074*** (0.014) -0.094*** (0.020)
ln(l)×
ln(i)
0.107*** (0.032) 0.025 (0.025) -0.028 (0.022)
ln(l)×
ln(k)
-0.012 (0.013) 0.100*** (0.017) 0.016 (0.017)
ln(i)×
ln(k)
-0.021 (0.013) -0.036** (0.012) 0.056*** (0.012)
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Estimated results from the translog stochastic fron-
tier production functions (continued)
Zhejiang Hubei Yunnan
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
intercept 0.350*** (0.041) -0.011 (0.017) 0.260*** (0.027)
Inefficiency model
Pred_posi 3.771*** (0.852) -2.648** (0.869) -8.795*** (1.997)
Pred_nega 8.782 (8.919) 2.193*** (0.619) 0.568 (0.438)
Plot_1 0.009 (0.018) -0.001 (0.005) 0.005 (0.004)
Plot_2 0.045*** (0.013) -0.007 (0.006) -0.039*** (0.009)
Plot_3 -0.277 (0.270) -0.097** (0.034) -0.011 (0.011)
Plot_4 0.046 (0.104) -0.042 (0.034) -0.010 (0.011)
Plot_5 -0.333 (276.513) -0.002 (0.021) -0.089* (0.040)
Plot_6 0.000 (.) -0.212 (0.639) -0.009 (0.045)
Elementary 0.015 (0.014) -0.009* (0.004) -0.021*** (0.003)
Secondary 0.017 (0.019) -0.012* (0.005) -0.031*** (0.007)
High 0.010 (0.027) -0.019 (0.010) -0.005 (0.011)
Skill 0.029 (0.025) 0.021** (0.008) -0.028 (0.038)
Cadre -27.767 (1278.717) -0.368 (0.536) -2.287 (2.388)
intercept -8.687*** (1.650) -2.112*** (0.391) -0.643* (0.267)




sigma_v 0.372 (0.007) 0.440 (0.005) 0.349 (0.007)
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Estimated results from the translog stochastic fron-
tier production functions (continued)
Zhejiang Hubei Yunnan
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Note: t = time; ln(a) = natural logarithm of a; ln( l) = natural logarithm of l;
ln(i) = natural logarithm of i; ln(k) = natural logarithm of k.
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
In terms of the magnitude of these elasticities at the sample mean, the
most important factors are labor, land, and intermediate inputs. In par-
ticular, the structure of the labor elasticities is consistent with the level of
regional development of the three provinces. It can be expected that op-
portunity costs of labor are relatively low in the less developed provinces
of Hubei and Yunnan, which, in turn, implies that farms allocate compar-
atively more labor to agricultural production than farms in relatively de-
veloped coastal regions such as Zhejiang. Our results indicate that agri-
cultural production in Hubei is very land intensive, with an estimated
elasticity of 0.51 at the sample mean. The corresponding elasticity of land
is still substantial in Zhejiang and Yunnan, with point estimates of 0.21
and 0.16 at the sample mean, respectively. The lowest partial production
elasticity is observed for capital. Contrary to labor, this is an indicator
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Table 3.6: Level of technical efficiency from 1996 to 2002 by provinces
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Average
Zhejiang 0.963 0.952 0.949 0.937 0.971 0.963 0.972 0.957
Hubei 0.911 0.912 0.912 0.909 0.916 0.918 0.915 0.913
Yunnan 0.845 0.869 0.872 0.847 0.875 0.885 0.875 0.867
of the relative scarcity of capital in agricultural production. Because the
elasticities correspond to ratios of an input’s marginal product to its av-
erage product, a small elasticity can also be attributed to high average
factor productivity. This will be the case when a factor such as capital is
scarce in Chinese agriculture. Intermediate inputs account for the most
important factor in Yunnan. In addition, the sum of the input elastic-
ities provides information about scale economies with results of 97% in
Zhejiang, 83% in Hubei, and 71% in Yunnan. These indicate that the
production technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale for the sample
mean in Hubei and Yunnan.
3.4.3 Technical efficiency
After estimation of the stochastic frontier production function, we calcu-
late technical efficiency for each farm household over the whole observa-
tion period. Table 3.6 reports the level of technical efficiency for the three
provinces over time and Figure 3.3, Figure 3.4, and Figure 3.5 presents
the kernel density distribution of technical efficiency for each of the sam-
pled villages from 1996 to 2002. Our results show that technical effi-
ciency stays relatively constant with moderate increase during the study
period, while the average level of the technical efficiency term mirrors
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the regional level of economic development. Figure 3.3, Figure 3.4, and
Figure 3.5 illustrate the variations in technical efficiency across villages
and households within the villages in the three provinces. The majority
of rural households in Zhejiang province operate close to the agricultural
production frontier. However, for the households in Hubei and Yunnan,
further growth of agricultural production through the improvement of
technical efficiency could be expected.
In the lower part of Table 3.5, we present the determinants for the vari-
ation of farm households’ inefficiency. The parameters indicate the direc-
tion of the effects these variables have on the inefficiency level. Hence, a
negative parameter estimate for some variable indicates a positive effect
on technical efficiency.
The coefficients of predicted changed arable land due to land reallocation
indicate negative effects on technical efficiency in Zhejiang and positive
effects in Hubei and Yunnan. The implication is that the impact of land
reallocation on technical efficiency is an empirical issue. In the case of
Hubei and Yunnan, land reallocation could act as a substitute for the land
rental market, which has been shown in the result of Stage 1 model es-
timation, to optimize the allocation of land resources and hence improve
technical efficiency of the farm. A study by Deininger and Jin (2005) sug-
gests that land rental markets are more effective than administrative re-
allocation in reallocating land to those with lower endowments and have
a bigger productivity-enhancing effect. Hence, even though administra-
tive land reallocation partially substitutes for the market mechanism and
contributes to the improvement of farm technical efficiency, the develop-
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Figure 3.5: The kernel density of technical efficiency across villages in
Yunnan province (1996-2002)
Source: Own figure.
ment of the land rental market needs to be encouraged in achieving al-
locative efficiency. This prescription is also reinforced by the results for
Zhejiang, where land rental markets and other related factor markets
are already relatively well functioning. Under these circumstances, the
administrative land reallocation process exerts a negative effect on the
technical efficiency of farmers.
In order to measure the impact of land fragmentation, we introduce six
variables for the share of plots with different sizes (see Table 3.3), using
the share of plots with size smaller than 0.5 mu as a reference. Even
though most of the coefficients are not significant, the prevailing negative
signs present information that the larger the plot size, the more efficient
the production. Thus, land fragmentation could be a hindrance to the
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improvement of technical efficiency. A dummy variable, which indicates
whether any of the household members is a township or village cadre, is
used here as a proxy for the management capability of farm households
and its effect is not significant in all three provinces. The share of rural
laborers with primary, secondary, and high school education and above
(share of illiterate rural laborers as reference) all have negative signs in
Hubei and Yunnan. Additionally, the higher the level of education, the
larger the efficiency scores. The coefficient of share of labor with skill
training is significantly positive only in Hubei. This could be explained
that skill training increases the chance of finding a job in an urban area;
hence, it is a disincentive to working in agricultural production.
3.5 Conclusion
Due to China’s economic reforms, farmers face an increased risk of land
reallocation and adjustment. This raises questions about the impact of
land reallocation on farm productivity and efficiency. An in-depth under-
standing of what determines land reallocation and whether, as well as, to
what extent farm production and efficiency are affected by the incidence
of land reallocation, could help policy makers introduce more targeted
rural development policies. Based on a panel data set from 1995 to 2002
for rural households in Zhejiang, Hubei, and Yunnan provinces, the de-
scriptive statistics show that frequent land reallocation is still common in
some villages. Our stage 1 model results indicate that the development
of the land rental market is essential because it can serve as a substi-
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tute for administrative land reallocation in optimizing the distribution
of land resources. Demographic change does affect land reallocation in
some regions. Even though land allocation is officially intended to guar-
antee equal access to land for all farmers, the negative effects on tenure
security are obvious, especially against the background of the ongoing
rural-urban migration.
The results from the stochastic frontier production function show that
land reallocation does have effects on technical efficiency. The differ-
ent signs for different provinces also imply that the impact of land re-
allocation on technical efficiency is an empirical issue. Because of the
possibility that administrative land reallocation can partially serve as a
substitute for missing or badly functioning land rental markets, land re-
allocation could facilitate the process of improving land access for more
successful farmers; hence, it could improve technical efficiency of agri-
cultural production. But at the same time, in regions where land rental
markets and other related factor markets are already relatively well de-
veloped, administrative land reallocation seems to distort the market
mechanism, undermining market signals, and thus seems to decrease
technical efficiency. In addition, our study also indicates that land frag-
mentation could be a major hindrance to the improvement of technical
efficiency while highlighting the important role of a higher level of edu-
cation, which exerts positive effects on the technical efficiency.
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Chapter 4
The impact of land security
and input allocation on farm
household income
The main contents of this chapter are based on the article “The impact of
land security and input allocation on farm household income”, and this
article is a cooperation with Xiaobing Wang and Bernhard Brümmer.
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4.1 Introduction
ONE major element of land reform implemented in rural China dur-ing the 1980s and the early 1990s highlights an extremely equal
distribution of cultivated land, meaning that land security could not be
guaranteed given the variation of household demographics, labor compo-
sition or land resources, etc. (Liu et al., 1998; Brandt et al., 2002). After
the expiration of the first round of land tenure, mainly in the later part
of the 1990s, the government issued a policy that legally prohibited the
transfer of land titles from one rural household to another to secure land
use rights with the purpose of intensifying agricultural production (Kung,
2000; Yao, 2000b). However, major differences exist between villages or
even within villages in the measures implemented, the degree of imple-
mentation, and the overall effects of land security policies, etc.(Zhang
et al., 2011). Land periodically reallocated by local leaders is still ob-
served to maintain egalitarianism despite the decrease of cultivated land
per capita due to the population growth, the shifts of land planning and
management, and the process of land degradation (Deng et al., 2006).
Land security reforms aiming at the creation of optimal land institutions
are parallel to reforms in other factor markets, which gradually allow for
diversifying the factor allocations among alternative income-generating
activities to improve the agent’s welfare. When examining government
statistics and studies in the literature, the metrics of employment, con-
sistent with the classical two-sector development of the model, shifted
from agriculture to non-agriculture and from rural to urban in the evolu-
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tion of land market and use(Lewis, 1954; Fei and Ranis, 1964; de Brauw
et al., 2002; Kung, 2002; Glauben et al., 2008; Kreps, 1990, NBSC, var-
ious years). Ravallion and van de Walle (2008) argued that one of the
major barriers to prosperity in Asia is the willingness and capacity to
invest in the usable assets that improve the productive accumulation of
farmers when farmers face the uncertainty of land security due to the
frequencies and magnitudes of land reallocation. China is no exception.
Bowlus and Sicular (2003) attested that farm structures are endogenous
instruments to the demand of on-farm labor, suggesting the existence of
land allocation constraints in production. Kimura et al. (2011) pointed
out that the perception of the land tenure insecurity determined by the
market wage also influences the desired level of cultivated land which
could be reached through the land rental market.
Well functioning factor markets, which are vital to making full use of
scarce resources, are required for the successful transition process in
agriculture (Swinnen and Rozelle, 2006). To overcome the constraints
caused by the lack of land security, the households’ decision whether and
how much to allocate inputs such as labor and capital among the pro-
duction activities is part of interacted economic choices. Without well-
functioning land sale or rental markets, a household makes simultaneous
decisions about its production in both the short and long term(Benjamin,
1992). Specifically, it makes decisions regarding its inputs, which affect
its short-term production, and it decides on its investment in household
resources, which affect long-term income capacity.
China’s vast regional differences may complicate the relationship between
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land security and sustained income growth. China’s economy is charac-
terized by significant variations across space in the levels of wealth, fac-
tor endowment and markets, which may affect the decisions regarding
factor allocations in profit-maximizing households (Nyberg and Rozelle,
1999). For example, in the rapidly developing coastal areas and sub-
urban areas around rapidly growing cities, farm households have be-
come increasingly wealthy through off-farm employment opportunities
or even by abandoning agricultural production altogether. In these situ-
ations, the farmer’s employment is only weakly tied to the land, and thus
insecure access to land which may potentially be assigned an inferior
quality in future reallocations are not essential to reduce the vulnera-
bility against poverty. In areas that are well off, the factor markets, in-
cluding the credit markets, are better developed although still imperfect
(Cheng et al., 2003). Households in these areas could have many oppor-
tunities for non-agricultural investment concerning a trade-off between
non-agricultural and agricultural income, which will be influenced by the
shrinkage of cultivated land per capita due to the conversion of land to
non-farm use.
The land insecurity implemented by Chinese local authorities and the
evolution of the factor markets provide a unique opportunity to explore
the sources of sustained income growth through a household’s joint deci-
sions in factor allocations. To achieve this target, a farm household anal-
ysis of income and its affecting factors has been done based on a panel
dataset of rural household surveys conducted in the Zhejiang and Hubei
provinces by the Ministry of Agriculture from 1995 to 2002. The rest of
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the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents the theoretical
framework and the following section is devoted to the econometric model.
Section 4.4 describes the data source and provides descriptive statistics
of variables. Section 4.5 explains the empirical results obtained from the
estimation of the normalized quadratic profit functions. The final section
concludes the analysis and offers policy implications.
4.2 Theoretical framework
To study the impacts that land insecurity and farm households’ input
allocation decisions have on their income, we start from the profit maxi-
mization problem in which the household engages in two production ac-
tivities: agriculture and non-agriculture. The variable profit function is
then defined as:
Π = Π(p, z) (4.1)
where p is a vector of netput (output or input) prices, and z is a vector
of quasifixed inputs. In the neoclassical production theory setting, it is
assumed that the objective of the farm household is the maximization of
short-run profit and that the farm household is a price-taker in the output
and variable input markets. If the profit function satisfies certain regu-
larity conditions, it is dual to the production function, and its parameters
contain sufficient information to describe the farm’s production technol-
ogy at profit-maximizing points in the production possibility set. These
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testable conditions of regularity are that the profit function is continuous,
twice differentiable, linearly homogeneous in prices, convex in all prices,
concave in fixed inputs, decreasing in the prices of the input, increasing
in the prices of the output, and non-decreasing in fixed inputs. Apply-
ing Hotelling’s Lemma to equation (4.1), the supply functions of output
and the derived demand functions of variable input can be obtained by




, i = 1, . . . , n (4.2)
where qis are positive for outputs, and negative for variable inputs.
When it comes to the practice of production activities in China’s farm
households, the assumption of profit maximization needs careful discus-
sion. The farmers are still assumed to be profit maximizers, but they
will not always succeed in allocating resources in different sectors and
choosing levels of outputs and inputs that will lead to a maximum level
of profit due to a series of institutional environment and factor market
constraints. The rural reform in China initiated in 1979, especially the
implementation of household responsibility system (HRS), liberalized the
rural labor force and similar production endowments to some extent. As
a result, incentives for agricultural production have been greatly im-
proved, and rural farmers’ incomes have also increased correspondingly
(Lin, 1992; Fan et al., 2002; Brümmer et al., 2006). In addition to the
decentralization of the production system, the united procurement and
marketing system was reformed step by step. By the mid-1990s, China’s
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agriculture had been transformed from a command-and-control system
to a largely free-market one, with more than 90% of all agricultural prod-
ucts sold at market-determined prices. 1 In contrast to the impressive
improvements in the functioning of product markets, constraints still ex-
ist in some important factor markets.
With the process of economic reform, the controls on rural labor mobil-
ity were relaxed and rural laborers were allowed to migrate for better
paid jobs. But obstacles still exist that hinder the free mobility of rural
labor. For instance, rural migrants are discouraged from bringing their
families to the cities because of the household registration (hukou) sys-
tem regulations which register rural and urban households separately
and firmly determine access to public services, e.g. education, housing,
or public welfare (Brosig et al., 2009; OECD, 2009b). There still exists
a certain amount of local protectionism, in which village workers often
earn much higher wages than outsiders (Yao, 1999). The introduction of
HRS granted land use rights to individual farm households, but left for-
mal ownership of the land in the hands of the government or the local
collective. Since the individual farm households do not have legal titles
to the land, they face the risk of administrative land reallocation and
adjustment. This induced land tenure insecurity reduces the incentives
of farm households to invest in the land and hinder the efficient use of
labor. Thus, the tenure insecurity may decrease agricultural productiv-
ity and hence their income.2 There is a great deal of relevant empiri-
1The rural policy reform in the last 30 years has been reviewed in detail in Fan et al.
(2002); Brümmer et al. (2006); OECD (2009a,b).
2See Kung (2000); Deininger and Feder (2001); Brandt et al. (2002) for a more de-
tailed discussions on land tenure security and land reallocation issues.
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cal research on these issues. As reported in Yang (2004), the relaxation
of controls on production endowments permitted farm households to re-
allocate their inputs from agriculture to nonagricultural activities, and
contributed significantly to household income growth. Using a hazard
analysis approach, Jacoby et al. (2002) find that higher land expropria-
tion risk significantly reduces the use of organic fertilizer, which has long-
lasting benefits for soil quality. Applying a stochastic frontier analysis ap-
proach, Zhang et al. (2011) argue that in regions where land rental mar-
kets and other related factor markets are already relatively well devel-
oped, administrative land reallocation seems to distort the market mech-
anism, undermine market signals, and thus decrease technical efficiency.
A study by Deininger and Jin (2005) suggests that land rental markets
are more effective than administrative reallocation in reallocating land to
those with lower endowments and have a bigger productivity-enhancing
effect. Following these analyses, we further study the impact of land in-
security and input allocation and their impact on farm household income.
In order to represent deviations from the “real” profit maximization, we
add the restrictions related to the institutional environment and factor
markets to the previous profit maximization model. Hence, the variable
profit function in equation (4.1) is extended as:
Πc = Πc(p, z; c) (4.3)
where Πc ≤ Π, and Πc will be equal to Π if all the constraints are relaxed
or deregulated; c is a vector of variables representing the effects of the
institutional environment and factor market constraints which have been
102
discussed above.
To illustrate, we analyze rural labor market in which farm households al-
locate their labor input (L) between agricultural (a) and non-agricultural
(n) sectors. Then the household aggregate profit is the sum of profits from
these two activities, and its profit function is written as:
Π = [fa(La)pa + fn(Ln)pn]− wx (4.4)
where L = La +Ln; fa(La) and fn(Ln) are output quantities of agricultural
and non-agricultural production, respectively, pa and pnare the associated
output prices; x is a vector of variable inputs and w represents the asso-
ciated input prices. Then equation (4.4) can be further expressed as:
Π = [fa(La)pa + fn(L− La)pn]− wx (4.5)
differentiation with respect to La gives the following first-order condition














equation (4.7) means that, to achieve the goal of profit maximization, the
household needs to adjust the level of its labor input between agricul-
tural and non-agricultural production so that the marginal revenue (MR)
of these two activities are equal. Graphically, L∗ in Figure 4.1 represents
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Figure 4.1: Profit loss due to misallocation of labor input
Source: Own figure.
the optimal point of the efficiently allocated labor input between these
two sectors. Due to the rural labor market constraints which have been
discussed above, we could expect that less-than-optimal level of labor in-
put is devoted to non-agricultural production. As a result, the household’s
labor allocation will be at the point L∼, on the right side of L∗. And the
shaded area 4ABC represents the household’s loss of profit due to the
misallocation of labor input between agricultural and non-agricultural
production. This analysis on rural labor market also applies to the house-
hold’s capital input allocation between agricultural and non-agricultural
activities and its crop cultivation structure decision.
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4.3 Econometric model
A specific functional form is needed for the estimation of the profit func-
tion discussed in Section 4.2. In this study, the normalized quadratic
profit function, from the class of second-order flexible functional forms,
is applied. The quadratic functional form is locally flexible and its Hes-
sian is a matrix of constants, which means curvature can be maintained
globally without altering the flexibility of the function form. It takes the
following form:






























where Πc/p1 is the short-run profit (revenue minus variable costs) divided
by the price of netput 1; (pi/p1)s are the prices of the variable netputs di-
vided by the price of variable netput 1; zis are the quantities of quasifixed
factors and technology proxy; cis are variables representing the effects of
the institutional environment and factor market constraints; and α, β, γ, δ
are parameters to be estimated. Here the profit function is normalized by
the price of netput 1 to ensure linear homogeneity in prices. Symmetry
is maintained by requiring αij = αji and βij = βji. Convexity and mono-
tonicity will be checked after the estimation.
The expected value of parameters δis deserve more detailed discussions.
Based on the theoretical framework, four variables (see Table 4.4) rep-
resenting the effects of the institutional environment and factor market
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constraints are introduced in the model: a dummy variable with a value
equal to 1 if the arable land of the farm household has been reallocated
within the year (Land_real), a second variable representing the share of
sown areas which are used for non-grain crops cultivation (Land_s), a
third variable representing the share of household labor input which are
allocated to non-agricultural production (Labor_s), and a fourth variable
representing the share of fixed-capital assets which are allocated to non-
agricultural production (Capital_s). As has already been discussed, fre-
quent land reallocation, which induces land tenure insecurity, will have
a negative effect on household income. To maintain food security, the
government kept the grain quota procurement system until it was finally
eliminated in 2001. But at the same time, the government raised pro-
curement prices to increase farmers’ incomes and to meet food security
goals. So the impact of farmers’ crop cultivation structure on their in-
come depends on the game between market prices and government sup-
port policies. Because restrictions still exist that hinder the free mobility
of rural labor, the effects of labor input share in non-agricultural produc-
tion are expected to be positive. As for the effect of capital input share to
non-agricultural production, it could be positive or negative. Given the
expected positive effects of labor input share, it is positive if capital input
and labor input are complementary in production, and it is negative if
these two inputs are substitutable. As is discussed in the section on the
theoretical framework, in addition to land tenure insecurity’s direct ef-
fects, it might also have indirect effects on income through its interaction
with other input allocations. As a result, the products of Land_real with
the other three control variables are also introduced into the model.
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Applying Hotelling’s Lemma to equation (4.4), the supply functions of
output and the derived demand functions of variable input can be ob-
tained by differentiating the profit function with respect to the normal-











where qi is positive for the supply of outputs and negative for the demand













































The price elasticities for the numeraire could then be calculated by ap-
plying the property of homogeneity of degree zero in prices for the supply
functions of output and the derived demand functions of variable input.
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4.4 Data source and descriptive statistics
4.4.1 Data Source
The database used in this study is drawn from fixed-point survey data
series across the Zhejiang and Hubei provinces in China, conducted an-
nually by rural survey teams.3 The two provinces covered were chosen
to reflect the diversity of China’s agricultural production. The Zhejiang
province is located in the southern wing of the Yangtze River Delta in
China, which was an early beneficiary of China’s “open door” policies af-
ter 1978. In the Zhejiang province, the arable land accounts for 2.125
million hectares, or 1.6% of the country (NBSC, 2001). Since 1978, Zhe-
jiang has experienced rapid growth and diversification of the economy.
From 1978 to 2002, its GDP achieved a yearly growth rate of 13% on av-
erage, and thus it jumped in rank from 12th to 4th out of all 31 Chinese
provinces in terms of economic performance. The GDP per capita rose
to 16,570 Yuan (2,004 USD) in 2002 with an annual increase of 12.1%,
while the per capita net income of rural residents reached 4,940 Yuan
(597 USD) with an annual growth rate of 8.7%. The sectoral composition
of the province’s economy has changed dramatically compared to other
provinces over the course of economic reforms. Agriculture accounts for
3The rural survey teams of the Ministry of Agriculture of China conducted the pri-
mary trial survey at the beginning of 1983 in nine provinces. After 1984, the survey was
extended to 28 provinces (excluding Tibet and Taiwan; later the survey included Hainan
and Chongqing after they separated from Guangdong and Sichuan provinces, respec-
tively, as well as Tibet. Thus, the survey finally covers 31 provinces and is conducted
annually), covering 71 counties, 93 townships, 272 villages and 37,422 rural households.
For financial reasons, the survey was not conducted in 1992 and 1994. By agreement,
we have obtained access to the household data of Zhejiang and Hubei provinces from
1995 to 2002.
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only 33% of provincial employment compared to a national average of
64%. Tertiary industry accounts for 33% (NBSC, 2004). Zhejiang is de-
veloping rapidly, and today it is one of the richest provinces in China.
Hubei, which is often called the “Land of Fish and Rice,” is a central
province in China. Hubei is the traditional heartland of Chinese agricul-
tural production whereas Hubei was chosen as one of the thirteen ma-
jor trial grain production provinces to directly subsidize grain producers
starting in 2004. The arable land in the Hubei province accounts for 4.950
million hectares, or 3.8% of the country (NBSC, 2001). 42.37% of those
in the labor force still undertake some kinds of agricultural work in the
Hubei province. Hubei’s economy ranks 12th in the country and its nom-
inal GDP for 2006 was 749.7 billion yuan (96.9 billion USD) with a per
capita of 13,169 yuan (1,709 USD). It is expected that Hubei will benefit
greatly after the completion of the “Three Gorge Dam” project conducted
in the western part of Hubei.
Before summarizing the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the
study, we provide a brief description of the fixed-pointed survey. The
survey is based on a multistage, random-cluster process to attain rich
information about the effect of rural reform on agricultural production
and rural development. Counties, which are below province-level admin-
istrative units, were stratified by income level and selected according to
a weighted sampling scheme. The villages within the counties were then
randomly chosen according to geographic diversification (plain, hilly, or
mountainous area), location (suburb of a city or not), and economic fea-
tures defined as mainly agriculture, forestry, husbandry, fishery or oth-
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ers. Subsequently, the household data of the respective villages are ran-
domly selected from the comprehensive household list kept by the village
leader. To maintain longitudinal household information, the same house-
holds were interviewed each time the survey was conducted. If the house-
hold was dropped from the survey and was not recorded on the household
list in the village, a new sample household was recruited from the same
village with another ID and remained in the survey for the following
years if it was qualified.4 Local enumerators train assistants from the
village and rural households to maintain daily diaries that completely
record all economic activities. An enumerator assistant is then assigned
to a group of ten households and helps the households complete their di-
aries. The assistants also check the diaries once a month. Every quarter
of a year, the local enumerators collect and check the completed forms. At
the end of the year, the forms are returned and entered into a nationally-
designed coding program. Households receive payments of between 50 to
200 Yuan (around 6 to 24 USD) from the local government for their ef-
forts. Close supervision of the data collection process and careful checks
of consistency ensure that this dataset is of relatively high quality. Thus,
the unbalanced panel data set includes 8,703 observations from 1995 to
2002, in which around 500 households from the Zhejiang province and
900 from the Hubei province participated .
4The household was dropped from the survey either due to the emigration of the
whole family from the village to an urban area or to another town or village, or because
the family members died after several years in the survey.
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4.4.2 Descriptive statistics
The summary of statistics of the characteristics of farm households in
Zhejiang (Table 4.1) and Hubei (Table 4.2) allow the comparison of the
structure of households participating in agricultural and non-agricultural
production over time. Total income per household is near the national
average in 2002 in Hubei, while it is significantly above average in Zhe-
jiang. Agricultural production activities generate by far the biggest com-
ponent of household income in landlocked province Hubei–about 57%–
while in the more diversified economy of coastal Zhejiang, it represents
around 40% for the whole sample period. Even though the proportion of
non-agricultural income has increased at a faster rate in Hubei than in
Zhejiang, Hubei’s non-agricultural income in 2002was still far behindthe
level seen in Zhejiang in 1995. In the pursuit of profit-maximization,
households are more concerned with non-agricultural production activi-
ties in Zhejiang than in Hubei. On average, the share of labor input in
non-agricultural production in Zhejiang is over 57% of the time alloca-
tion of a household’s labor, measured in the unit of days; however, it is
still less than 34% in Hubei, even though workers there have been more
likely to engage in off-farm employment since 1995. Entering the 1990s,
the impediments to non-agricultural activities had been largely relaxed,
farm households could locate and maintain capital in non-agricultural
business under their control. The fact that capital accumulation in non-
agricultural business is much less in Hubei than that in Zhejiang is
driven by the lower level of capital endowment and the smaller propor-





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































It is well-known that agricultural sectors in China are dominated by
small scale farms and that these farms face a certain risk of shrinkage
of cultivated land and land insecurity. Average farm sizes in the sam-
ple reflect that average land area per household in South East China is
below the national average of nearly 0.6 ha (NBSC, 2003). Average of
total sown area is 8.69 mu5 in Hubei and 4.81 mu in Zhejiang.6 From
1995 to 2002, the reduction of sown area per household is 2.6 mu in Zhe-
jiang, which is twice as much as that in Hubei. This also suggests that in
the well-off areas, the farmers are less dependent on agricultural produc-
tion. Agricultural production is also diversified into grain crops and other
high-profit crops like oilseeds, vegetables, fruits and husbandry produc-
tion. Our data also show that the non-grain cropping has been intensified
in both Zhejiang and Hubei over time given the constraints of land en-
dowment. The prevalence of land reallocation was reflected in our data
in the two provinces because on average, more than 20% of households
experienced land reallocation in the period of time from 1995-2002. The
dimension of land reallocation varied over time and between provinces
with the evidence that more than 30% of sampled households have expe-
rienced land reallocation in different years. The land reallocation rate in
our data is lower than that (75%) in the study by Kimura et al. (2011).
This is because they recorded the land reallocation starting from the very
beginning of the implementation of HRS, while our statistics were ob-
tained later, even after the expiration of the first round of land tenure
51 mu = 1/15 hectare in China.
6In the two provinces, the cropping pattern generally involves sowing twice per year




The dependent variable used in the normalized quadratic profit functions
is the net income from the non-agricultural employment and agricultural
production, which aggregates the profit of producing physical products
from crop, livestocks and other agricultural products. A time trend is in-
cluded to capture technological progress. The descriptive statistics of the
variables presented in Table 4.3 reveal several important variations of
output and inputs across provinces. It is reported that the rural house-
hold in Zhejiang earns more income, on average, from both agricultural
and non-agricultural activities. The former include outputs from farm-
ing, forestry, husbandry and fishery while the latter are obtained from
the diversified off-farm employment such as manufacturing, construc-
tion, transportation and other services, etc. In agricultural production,
households in Zhejiang have less land than those in Hubei in the unit
of mu and use the same level of intermediate input. This implies that
the technologies applied in agricultural production are to a larger ex-
tent region-specific due to the different constraints of land endowment.
Here, intermediate inputs in the value term include grain and cash crop
seeds, fertilizer, agricultural diesel oil, plastics and pesticides in agricul-
tural production. The labor input is the total number of annual working
days of all of the rural labor, including both on- and off-farm employ-
ment activities. Capital input measured in the unit of yuan is defined as
fixed-capital assets of the household at the end of the year and includes
draught animals, production tools, production buildings, and machinery





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ties of the three composite netput categories are measured at constant
1995 prices.
Divisia price indexes are calculated for the three composite netput cate-
gories (two outputs and one input). The producer price indexes of each
netput within the three composite netput categories are drawn from the
China Statistical Yearbook (NBSC, various years) and the China Rural
Statistical Yearbook (NBSC, various years), and have been converted into
cumulative (chained) indexes with the base year 1995 equal to 1. The Di-
visia price indexes are then computed with value shares of netputs as
weights.
4.5 Estimation results
Before the estimation, in order to avoid numerical difficulties in the max-
imum likelihood estimations and to facilitate the interpretation of the
parameter estimates, the normalized profit, the two normalized netput
prices and the three quasifixed input variables are scaled to have a mean
of zero, respectively. As a result, at the sample mean, the transformed
variables take the value zero. Hence, in the estimation results, the first-
order coefficients of the normalized netput prices variables can be inter-
preted as quantities of the supply of output or the derived demand of vari-
able input, and that of the quasifixed input variables can be interpreted
as their shadow prices at the sample mean. Because a panel dataset is
used in this study, the fixed effects (FE) model and the random effects
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(RE) model have been estimated separately, and the results of the Haus-
man test strongly reject the random effects model at the 1% significance
level, suggesting that the unobserved time-invariant farm household ef-
fects are correlated with the explanatory variables in the estimations.
Consequently, the following discussions are based on the results from the
fixed effects model estimation. The estimated results of the normalized
quadratic profit functions for the Zhejiang and Hubei provinces are pre-
sented in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Results of the normalized quadratic profit
functions with fixed effects model estimates
Zhejiang Hubei
p∗2 8.893* (4.278) 12.324*** (1.072)
p∗3 -6.847 (5.996) -4.519*** (1.327)
t 0.839*** (0.133) 0.060 (0.043)
a 1.484*** (0.088) 0.491*** (0.029)
l 0.085 (0.195) 0.296*** (0.040)
k 0.120** (0.046) 0.230*** (0.025)
Land_real -0.164 (1.180) -0.370 (0.228)
Land_s -0.003 (0.009) 0.004 (0.004)
Capital_s 0.009 (0.010) -0.006* (0.003)
Labor_s 0.060*** (0.009) 0.025*** (0.003)
Land_real×Land_s -0.009 (0.016) -0.010* (0.004)
Land_real×Capital_s 0.006 (0.011) 0.008** (0.003)
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Results of the normalized quadratic profit functions
with fixed effects model estimates (continued)
Zhejiang Hubei
Land_real×Labor_s -0.007 (0.012) 0.010* (0.004)
0.5p∗2×p∗2 248.725 (167.968) 40.360 (23.857)
0.5p∗3×p∗3 38.705 (90.483) 34.614*** (9.303)
p∗2×p∗3 30.677 (85.531) 0.879 (12.967)
0.5t×t 0.219 (0.125) 0.078 (0.041)
0.5a×a -0.052 (0.029) -0.027*** (0.006)
0.5l×l 0.002 (0.012) 0.018* (0.008)
0.5k×k -0.002 (0.002) -0.005*** (0.001)
t×a 0.079 (0.042) 0.038** (0.014)
t×l 0.103 (0.071) 0.010 (0.014)
t×k 0.024* (0.011) 0.012* (0.006)
a×l -0.042 (0.032) 0.009 (0.007)
a×k 0.004 (0.005) -0.004 (0.002)
l×k 0.017 (0.012) -0.012** (0.004)
p∗2×t -5.664 (4.039) 0.434 (0.841)
p∗2×a 1.759 (1.446) -0.257 (0.343)
p∗2×l -6.650** (2.296) -0.314 (0.336)
p∗2×k -0.636 (0.335) -0.167 (0.148)
p∗3×t -1.137 (3.721) -1.409* (0.714)
p∗3×a 0.153 (1.578) -0.614 (0.331)
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Results of the normalized quadratic profit functions
with fixed effects model estimates (continued)
Zhejiang Hubei
p∗3×l -0.265 (2.501) -0.877** (0.331)
p∗3×k 0.616* (0.301) 0.025 (0.139)




log likelihood -6795.890 -
15845.555
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors
H0: Land_s can actually be treated as exogenous
χ2 q2(1) = 0.085 q2(1) = 0.029
P-value 0.771 0.865
H0: Capital_s can actually be treated as exogenous
χ2 q2(1) = 2.578 q2(1) = 0.603
P-value 0.108 0.438
H0: Labor_s can actually be treated as exogenous
χ2 q2(1) = 0.240 q2(1) = 2.094
P-value 0.624 0.148
Note: p∗2 and p∗3 are normalized prices, where p∗2 = p2/p1 and p∗3 = p3/p1.
Standard errors are given in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4.5: The Hessian matrix and its eigenvalues
Zhejiang Hubei
The Hessian Eigenvalues The Hessian Eigenvalues
248.725 30.677 253.115 40.360 0.879 40.491
30.677 38.705 34.316 0.879 34.614 34.483
Given the structure of the model, the three share variables (Land_s, Cap-
ital_s and Labor_s) reflect household production choices and might cause
endogeneity problems in the estimation. Although the use of the fixed
effects model estimation could partially overcome these problems, the in-
strumental variables estimations have been done to test for the endo-
geneity of the potentially endogenous regressors. In the model, a one-
year lag of these three variables is used as an excluded instrument in
the estimation considering the potential endogeneity problem, and the
test results are given in the lower part of Table 4.4. The test statistics
suggest that all of the three share variables (Land_s, Capital_s and La-
bor_s) can be treated as exogenous in the Zhejiang and Hubei provinces.
As was already discussed in the econometric model, one merit of the
quadratic functional form is that the Hessian matrix of its second-order
partial derivatives only contains constants and hence its curvature prop-
erties are global. Eigenvalues of the Hessian for the Zhejiang and Hubei
provinces are checked and the results are listed in Table 4.5. Since the
Hessian is positive semidefinite for both provinces, the normalized quadratic
profit function is convex at all points of the sample.
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Since the two normalized netput prices and the three quasifixed input
variables have been scaled, the coefficients of p∗2 can be interpreted as
quantities of the supply of non-agricultural products, and the absolute
value of the coefficients of p∗3 can be interpreted as quantities of the de-
rived demand for intermediate inputs, at the sample mean. From the
estimation results, the two normalized prices p∗2 and p∗3 all have correct
signs, and they are strongly significant at a level of 5% except for p∗3 of
the Zhejiang province. The coefficients of technology (t) are both positive,
and the significant effect on farm household income is only observed in
the Zhejiang province.
As for the three quasifixed inputs, the coefficients, which can be inter-
preted as their shadow prices at the sample mean, all have correct signs,
and they are strongly significant at a level of 5% except for arable land
input (l) in the Zhejiang province. The shadow price of labor in the Zhe-
jiang province is much higher (almost threefold) than that in the Hubei
province, which is in accordance with the economic development level of
the two provinces. In China, the Zhejiang province is located on the coast
and is one of the richest provinces, while the Hubei province represents
the middle-income region in the central part of the country. Rural enter-
prises, especially restructured township and village enterprises (TVEs),
have always been privileged in the coastal provinces, since they have rel-
atively easy access to both export markets and to large domestic markets
in the densely populated and relatively rich eastern provinces (OECD,
2009b). Therefore, the concentration of rural enterprises in the Zhejiang
province is much stronger than that in the Hubei province in terms of em-
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ployment, value of production, and assets. The same story applies to the
interpretation of the difference in shadow price of capital input for the
two provinces. For farm households in China, non-agricultural incomes
are very important to their level of net incomes. In our sample, on av-
erage roughly 60% of total income comes from non-agricultural activities
for farm households in the Zhejiang province, while the number is 43%
in the Hubei province. So in the estimated results, it is not very surpris-
ing to see that the shadow price of arable land in the Zhejiang province
is small and not statistically different from zero at the 5% significance
level.
The coefficients of Land_real, which index land tenure insecurity, are neg-
ative but not statistically significant for both provinces. Direct effects of
administrative land reallocation on farm household income are therefore
not observed in our sample. The coefficients of Land_s are also not signif-
icant, which indicates that farmers’ choice of crop cultivation structure
has not significantly affected their income in our sample. The coefficient
of Capital_s is not statistically significant for the Zhejiang province, but
it is significant and negative for the Hubei province. The insignificance
of Capital_s in the Zhejiang province indicates that, statistically, a one
percent increase of capital input share in non-agricultural activities or a
one percent decrease of that in agricultural activities will not bring any
more profit at the 5% significance level. In other words, the sectoral allo-
cation of capital input between agricultural and non-agricultural produc-
tion could be seen as already at the optimum for farm households in the
Zhejiang province. In contrast, the negative sign for the Hubei province
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shows that a less-than-optimal level of capital input is devoted to agri-
cultural production, and farm households’ income will increase if they
allocate more capital from non-agricultural activities to agricultural use.
The coefficients of Labor_s are positive and statistically significant at a
0.1% level for both provinces. The results indicate that the rural labor
market has not yet reached the optimum, and a less-than-optimal level
of labor input is devoted to non-agricultural activities, which is consis-
tent with the findings from Yang (2004). Judged from the magnitude of
the coefficients, the same adjustment level of labor from agricultural to
non-agricultural activities will bring more profit to farm households in
Zhejiang than in Hubei.
As for the indirect effects of land tenure insecurity on rural income through
the interactions with other input allocations, the coefficients of the inter-
action terms are all not statistically significant at 5% level for the Zhe-
jiang province, which means that there are also no indirect effects of land
tenure insecurity on the farm household income observed in our sample.
In contrast, the coefficients of the interaction terms are all statistically
significant for the Hubei province. The effect of the interaction term of
Land_real with Land_s is negative, which means that allocating more
arable land from non-grain crops to grain crops production will bring
additional profit to farm households whose lands have been administra-
tively reallocated compared to those whose lands have not. The effects of
the interaction terms of Land_real with Capital_s and Labor_s are both
positive. The results could be interpreted that an adjustment of labor and
capital inputs from agricultural to non-agricultural activities will bring
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Table 4.6: Uncompensated (Marshallian) price elasticities of outputs and
variable inputs at the sample means
Zhejiang Hubei
p1 p2 p3 p1 p2 p3
q1 1.120 -0.940 -0.179 2.568 -2.202 -0.366
q2 -0.348 0.277 0.071 0.164 -0.163 -0.001
q3 0.165 -0.139 -0.026 0.006 0.015 -0.021
additional profit to farm households whose lands have been administra-
tively reallocated compared to those whose lands have not.
After the estimation, the uncompensated or Marshallian price elastici-
ties of outputs and variable inputs are calculated and reported at the
sample means for both provinces in Table 4.6. Under the assumption of
profit maximization, own price elasticities of output supply must be pos-
itive and own price elasticities of input demand must be negative. From
Table 4.6 we can see that all own price elasticities have the correct sign
except for the non-agricultural products in the Hubei province. Since
roughly 24% of the observations in the Hubei province have zero non-
agricultural products, we suspect this might be the source of the wrong
sign of the non-agricultural products supply elasticity. To control for the
effects of those farm households who do not have non-agricultural activi-
ties, we introduced a dummy variable into the model with value equal to
1 if positive non-agricultural products are observed for the farm house-
hold and the interaction term of the dummy variable with the normalized
price of non-agricultural products. Yet after the re-estimation, the calcu-
lated own price elasticity of the non-agricultural products is still nega-
tive. The results indicate that own price elasticities for agricultural prod-
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ucts are elastic while own price elasticities for non-agricultural products
and intermediate inputs are inelastic for both the Zhejiang and Hubei
provinces.
4.6 Concluding remarks
In this study, the normalized quadratic profit function is used to analyze
profit maximization problems in farm households in rural China. Addi-
tional variables have been introduced to capture the effects of a series of
institutional environment and factor market constraints, including land
insecurity, crop cultivation structure, labor input and capital input allo-
cations between agricultural and non-agricultural productions. A panel
dataset covering two distinct provinces and eight years allows us to study
factors affecting farm household income and do some regional compar-
isons.
Our results indicate that, although the official controls on rural labor mo-
bility have been relaxed, the rural labor market has not yet reached the
optimal level, and a less-than-optimal level of labor input is devoted to
non-agricultural activities for farm households in both provinces. The es-
timated results suggest that those government policy choices which help
further facilitate the outflow of labor from agriculture into other economic
sectors, through outmigration for example, will bring significant income
effects to farm households. In contrast to the optimized rural capital
market for farm households in the Zhejiang province, households in the
Hubei province have not efficiently allocated their capital input between
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agricultural and non-agricultural productions, and their income will in-
crease if they allocate more capital from non-agricultural to agricultural
use. At the same time, the finding that the farmers’ choice of crop culti-
vation structure has no significant effect on their income reflects that the
united procurement and marketing system has been largely deregulated
during the research period and farmers could adjust their crop cultiva-
tion structure according to the market prices. Although the grain quota
procurement system still existed until 2001, the government had con-
currently raised procurement prices for grain substantially to increase
farmers’ income and to meet food security goals.
In the Zhejiang province, we observe that land tenure insecurity, which
is induced by administrative land reallocation, has neither direct nor in-
direct effects on farm household income through the interactions with
other input allocations. The explanation for this is that, on the one hand,
off-farm income has accounted for a large proportion of household net
income, as is already shown in the descriptive statistics, so income de-
pendence on land has decreased to some extent. On the other hand, ac-
cording to the research results from Zhang et al. (2011), the development
of the land rental market can serve as a substitute for administrative
land reallocation in optimizing the distribution of land resources, and the
Zhejiang province is a case with a relatively well developed land rental
market. So we could say that the negative effects of land tenure inse-
curity have been largely offset by the positive effects of a relatively well
functioning land rental market. In the Hubei province, although the di-
rect effects of land tenure insecurity are not observed, the indirect effects
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through the interactions with the other three input allocations are all sig-
nificant. The negative effects of the interaction term of Land_real with
Land_s indicate that administrative land reallocation will disturb farm
households’ decisions regarding the adjustment of crop cultivation struc-
ture and hence affect their income growth. Similarly, frequent land re-
allocation, which induces land tenure insecurity, will further distort the
market mechanism, reinforce farm households’ misallocations of the in-
puts, impede their adjustment process to the optimal allocation of inputs




THE work covered in this thesis is motivated by the impressive per-formance of China’s agricultural production since the reform in
1979 and the currently hotly disputed issues on rural land policy re-
form. With three implicitly connected research topics being proposed,
both theoretical discussions and empirical estimations have been com-
prehensively conducted in the thesis. This study contributes to the liter-
ature explaining China’s agricultural productivity and efficiency change
in the last three decades, the ongoing assessment of land tenure security
under China’s unique land tenure system, and, specifically, the impact of
land tenure insecurity on farm household productive efficiency and thus
in farm household income. The next section summarizes the main re-




Research topic 1: Our estimation results show that, on the national av-
erage, the best performance in terms of technical efficiency is exhibited in
the first reform phase (1979-1984), while technical efficiency deteriorated
substantially during the second phase and remained at a lower level for
the third and fourth reform phases. In the last two phases, technical ef-
ficiency initially continued to decrease but then increased again in 2007
and 2008. For the comparison of the six regional groups, the trend of di-
vergence in terms of performance of technical efficiency is obvious in the
whole sample period. Technical efficiency for the coastal provinces has re-
mained high during all of the reform phases except for a small drop in the
third phase. The performance of technical efficiency for the northwestern
provinces is quite poor, and the gap between them and other regions is in-
creasing as reforms continue to be implemented. Another region to which
our attention has been drawn is the northeastern provinces. Their level
of technical efficiency was very high among the six regions in the first
four phases, but their score decreased substantially in the fifth phase,
and they now rank second to last in the six regions. The performance of
the other three regional groups are relatively consistent with the national
average level. From the analysis of TFP change and its decomposition,
we find that the impressive improvement of TFP change (222%) over the
last three decades is dominated by the outstanding performance of tech-
nical change (360.5%). At the same time, both technical efficiency change
(-18.5%) and scale effects (-3.6%) have worked against improvement in
TFP change. This result is consistent with the findings of many previous
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studies (Wu, 1995; Kalirajan et al., 1996; Mao and Koo, 1997; Wu et al.,
2001; Chen et al., 2008) that the main source of China’s agricultural pro-
ductivity growth since the reform is from technical progress and not from
efficiency change.
Research topic 2: Our stage 1 model results indicate that the devel-
opment of the land rental market is essential because it can serve as a
substitute for administrative land reallocation in optimizing the distribu-
tion of land resources. Demographic change, measured on both the village
level and the household level, has no effect on administrative land reallo-
cation in the Zhejiang province, whereas it does impact land reallocation
in the Hubei and Yunnan provinces. The estimated results of the effects
of the government policy suggest that land tenure, to a large extent, has
been secured after the announcement of the extension of the right to land
use for another 30 years.
The results from the stochastic frontier production function show that
administrative land reallocation does have effects on technical efficiency.
The estimated coefficients indicate that it has negative effects on tech-
nical efficiency in the Zhejiang province and positive effects in the Hubei
and Yunnan provinces. Judging from the average yearly efficiency scores,
our results show that technical efficiency stays relatively constant with
a moderate increase during the study period, while the average level of
the technical efficiency term mirrors the regional level of economic devel-
opment. In addition, the variations in technical efficiency across villages
and over households within the village are observed. The majority of ru-
ral households in the Zhejiang province operate close to the agricultural
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production frontier. However, for the farm households in the Hubei and
Yunnan provinces, further growth of agricultural production through the
improvement of technical efficiency could be expected. This result is con-
sistent with that of regional comparisons in terms of technical efficiency
in the first topic of research.
Research topic 3: Our estimation results indicate that, although the
official controls on rural labor mobility have been relaxed, the rural labor
market has not yet reached the optimum, and that a less-than-optimum
level of labor input is devoted to non-agricultural activities for farm house-
holds in both the Zhejiang and Hubei provinces. In contrast to the al-
ready optimized rural capital market for farm households in the Zhejiang
province, households in the Hubei province again did not efficiently al-
locate their capital input between agricultural and non-agricultural pro-
ductions, and their income will increase if they allocate more capital from
non-agricultural to agricultural use. At the same time, the result that
farmers’ choices of crop cultivation structure have no significant effect
on their income shows that the state-monopolized procurement and mar-
keting system has been largely deregulated during the research period
and farmers could adjust their crop cultivation structure according to the
market prices. Although the grain quota procurement system still ex-
isted until 2001, the government had concurrently raised procurement
prices for grain substantially to increase farmers’ income and to meet
food security goals.
In the Zhejiang province, we observe that land tenure insecurity, which
is induced by administrative land reallocation, has neither a direct nor
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indirect effect on farm household income through its interactions with
other input allocations. In the Hubei province, although direct effects
of land tenure insecurity are not observed, the indirect effects through
its interactions with the other three input allocations are all significant,
which means that land tenure insecurity reduced farmers’ income by the
way of affecting input allocative efficiency.
5.2 Policy implications
Research topic 1: Connecting the performance of technical efficiency
with the government’s agricultural policy in different reform phases, we
argue that the implementation of a new institutional arrangement aim-
ing at factor market reform has contributed to a high level of technical
efficiency. A good example is the implementation of HRS in the first re-
form phase. HRS liberalized the rural labor forces and other production
endowments, which greatly motivated farm household agricultural pro-
duction. After the first phase, reform policies were mainly designed to
solve pricing and marketing problems of agricultural products without
including further reform of some important input markets. The nega-
tive side effects of these policies have been illustrated by the poor perfor-
mance of technical efficiency in the following phases. Hence, in addition
to the series of policy designs concerning rural social welfare that aim to
increase farmers’ income and to eliminate the rural-urban divide which
the government has stressed since the early 2000s, other reform polices
focusing on rural factor markets, such as the reform of the household
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registration system (hukou system) and the reform related to the land
tenure system concerning farmers’ rights to land, need to be introduced
or furthered in order to improve productive efficiency in farm households.
In addition, the ever-growing efficiency gap between the western provinces
and the other regions suggests that agricultural production for the west-
ern regional groups was not able to gradually catch up with the produc-
tion frontier, and therefore more preferential policies should be carried
out in these regions to improve their technical efficiency. The outstand-
ing performance of technical change for all provinces has reflected the
success of the government’s long-term efforts on investment in agricul-
tural technology and rural infrastructure. At the same time, we also no-
tice that the rank of performance in terms of technical change for the six
regional groups is almost the exact opposite to that of technical efficiency
change. This comparison illustrates that, although having experienced
faster technical progress because of the government’s support, those re-
gions are still characterized by less efficient agricultural production. The
implication is that these regions still have the potential of agricultural
productivity growth if corresponding policies are implemented to improve
technical efficiency.
In contrast to technical efficiency change and technical change, the pat-
tern of the annual average growth rate of the scale effects for the 28
provinces does not show any regional differences. Ten provinces have
positive growth rates and are dispersed throughout all of the six regional
groups. The fact that almost two-thirds of the provinces have experienced
negative growth rates in the scale effects suggests that there is still room
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for the structural adjustment of agricultural production.
Research topic 2: The different signs of coefficients of land realloca-
tion for different provinces imply that its impact on technical efficiency
is an empirical issue. Because of the possibility that administrative land
reallocation can partially serve as a substitute for missing or badly func-
tioning land rental markets (which has been shown in the result of Stage
1 model estimation), land reallocation could facilitate the process of im-
proving land access for more successful farmers; hence, it could improve
the technical efficiency of agricultural production. But at the same time,
in regions where land rental markets and other related factor markets
are already relatively well developed, administrative land reallocation
seems to distort the market mechanism, undermine market signals, and
thus seems to decrease technical efficiency.
Although land reallocation could act as a substitute for the land rental
market to optimize the allocation of land resources and hence improve
technical efficiency of the farm, a study by Deininger and Jin (2005) sug-
gests that land rental markets are more effective than administrative
reallocation in reallocating land to those with lower endowments and
enhance productivity to a greater extent. Hence, the development of
the land rental market needs to be encouraged to achieve allocative ef-
ficiency. This recommendation is reinforced by our results for Zhejiang,
where land rental markets and other related factor markets are already
relatively well functioning. Under these circumstances, the administra-
tive land reallocation process exerts a negative effect on the technical
efficiency of farmers.
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Research topic 3: In the Zhejiang province, the finding that land tenure
insecurity has no significant effect on farm household income implies
that, on the one hand, since off-farm income has accounted for a large
proportion of household net income, as is already shown in the descrip-
tive statistics, household income dependence on land has decreased to
some extent. On the other hand, according to the research results from
Zhang et al. (2011), the development of the land rental market can serve
as a substitute for administrative land reallocation in optimizing the dis-
tribution of land resources. The Zhejiang province is one case with a
relatively well developed land rental market. So we could say that the
negative effects of land tenure insecurity have been largely offset by the
positive effects of a relatively well functioning land rental market.
In the Hubei province, the observed indirect effects of land tenure inse-
curity on rural income through the interactions with other input alloca-
tions indicate that the administrative land reallocation will disturb the
decisions of farm households regarding the adjustment of crop cultiva-
tion structure and hence negatively affect their income growth. This is
consistent with the argument of Yao (2010), who asserts that farmers in
some localities are forced to plant certain cash crops because the local
government can then collect agricultural special product tax. Similarly,
periodic land reallocation, which induces land tenure insecurity, will fur-
ther distort the market mechanism, reinforce misallocations of the inputs
by farm households, impede their adjustment process to the optimal allo-
cation of inputs, and hence hinder their income growth.
In addition, the estimated results from both the Zhejiang and Hubei
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provinces suggest that the government should improve the social and
economic environment to help further facilitate the outflow of labor from
agriculture into other economic sectors, for example through outmigra-
tion. This will have significant effects on farm household income.
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